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State Taxation of Energy
Resources: Are Consuming States
Getting Burned?
Nancy E. Shurtz*
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the severe energy shortage it
caused in the United States prompted federal authorities to formulate
a national energy policy that would encourage exploitation of domes-
tic energy resources. As the federal government has implemented this
energy policy, states rich in natural resources have begun to tax the
energy mining and production operations within their borders. In this
Article Professor Shurtz discusses the constitutional limits of this tax-
ation and examines how the revenues from these taxes alter the bal-
ance of wealth between energy-producing and energy-consuming
states. Professor Shurtz concludes that revisions in revenue sharing
formulae, limitations on energy taxes agreed upon in a multistate
compact, and efforts to make states energy independent should be ex-
plored as possible solutions to avoid a potential energy conflict be-
tween the states.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the Arab oil embargo of 1973 the United States was
for the first time confronted with a severe energy shortage. The
nation suddenly found itself unprepared to deal with the many ec-
onomic disruptions initiated by the abrupt curtailment of foreign
oil supplies. To counteract the effects of any future cutbacks by
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the
federal government attempted to formulate a national energy pol-
icy that would reduce the country's dependence on imported oil.
Federal authorities began to implement this policy in hopes of pro-
moting conservation, encouraging the use of domestic energy re-
sources, and fostering the development of alternate energy
sources." Although this policy has met with relative success in in-
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon Law School, on leave from
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. B.A., 1970, University of Cincinnati; J.D.,
1972, Ohio State University-, LL.M., 1977, Georgetown University.
1. Congress and state legislatures adopted a variety of measures to accomplish these
objectives. One of the first federal statutes, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
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creasing domestic energy supplies,2 the Reagan Administration has
not supported the continued growth of these programs.3 On the
contrary, the current administration has pledged to reduce the fed-
eral presence in energy conservation and production.4
As the federal government has diminished its presence in the
administration and direction of the energy industry, new regional
95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978), called for the gradual deregulation of natural gas prices. In
1979 President Carter initiated decontrol of oil prices through the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973), and the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975). The theory underlying deregula-
tion was to allow the prices of American oil and gas to reach worldwide levels to provide
domestic oil producers with financial incentives to develop further America's energy re-
sources, and, thus, to reduce the nation's dependence on foreign oil.
In 1980 Congress adopted the Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611
(1980), which created the United States Synfuels Corporation and provided numerous price
and loan subsidies for the development of alternative energy resources. The Energy Tax Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (1978), and the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980), (Windfall Profit Tax), established credits
and other tax incentives for conservation and the development of renewable energy sources
such as solar, water, wind, geothermal, ocean thermal, wood, hydroelectric, and biomass, as
well as nonrenewable energy sources, including petroluem coke, coke gas, pitch, oil, and
synthetic fuels.
The Windfall Profit Tax also imposed an excise tax on the producer of oil based on the
difference between the "removal price" and the "base price" of the oil. The removal price is
usually the price at which the oil is sold to a third party purchaser. If the oil is removed
before sale, transferred to a related party, or refined by an integrated company, then the
removal price is the constructive sale price, as determined in § 163 of the Windfall Profit
Tax Act. The base price of oil depends on the type of oil being sold. The base price of Tier 1
oil is the price at which the oil sold under the 1979 energy price controls. The base prices of
Tier 2 and Tier 3 oil fluctuate, depending on the grade, quality, and location of the oil. The
tax rate also varied depending on the type of oil being produced.
At the time of adoption of the Windfall Profit Tax federal officials estimated that reve-
nues from the tax would be $270 billion over a ten-year period-a portion of which would be
earmarked for energy programs. See Shurtz, The Windfall Profits Tax-Poor Tax Policy?
Poor Energy Policy?, 34 U. MIAIm L. REv. 1115, 1136-39 (1980).
2. The increase in tax revenues from energy-related taxes in energy producing states
reflects the success of the energy production incentives. See infra note 5 and accompanying
text.
3. For example, the current administration has declined to fund the programs estab-
lished by the Energy Security Act, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980). Similarly, the
administration has recommended eliminating the energy tax incentives and dismantling the
Department of Energy Office of Alcohol Fuels. U.S. DE'T OF ENERGY, QUARTERLY REPORT TO
THE PRESmENT AND CONGRsS, at 2, 3 (Apr.-June 1981); see Shurtz, Promoting Alcohol Fu-
els Production: Tax Expenditures? Direct Expenditures? No Expenditures? 36 Sw. L.J. 597,
639-40 nn. 362, 364 (1982).
4. For example, the Reagan Administration has allowed the expiration of the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 760g (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), which
imposed ceiling prices on domestic crude oil sales. Further, § 602 of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 337-38, reduces the tax created by the
Windfall Profit Tax on newly discovered oil from 30% of the so-called "windfall profit" to
15% by 1986.
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energy problems, resulting largely from the relationship of the en-
ergy-producing states to the energy-consuming states, have arisen.
As a result of production incentives, states rich in oil, gas, and coal
resources have been able to generate huge revenues from energy
resources on their land or on federal land within their borders.
5 Of
all the state revenue sources that affect the energy industry,' taxa-
tion schemes remain the most controversial with regard to the rela-
tionship between energy-producing and consuming states.7 By tax-
ing their energy resources producing states potentially can export
their tax burden to the consuming midwestern and northeastern
states.8 Over the last five years both the rates and types of natural
resources taxation schemes have increased dramatically.9 Even en-
5. The large increases in producing states' revenues between fiscal 1979 and fiscal 1981
reflect the effects of oil price decontrol. See P. Mieszkowski & E. Toder, Taxation of Energy
Resources: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Efficiency, (1981)
(unpublished paper).
6. States can generate revenue from energy resources in three ways: (1) state taxes
derived from the mining and exploitation of resources, see infra part II; (2) rents or royal-
ties collected from the enterprise that extracts the energy source; and (3) production and
marketing of energy resources by the states themselves.
While state taxation schemes are the topic of this Article, the collection of rents and
royalties by producing states amounts to a significant source of revenue. State receipts from
mineral leases have grown from approximately $.5 billion in 1972 to $3.3 billion in fiscal
1980. Eighty percent of these receipts are from activities on state-owned land. The remain-
der are from lease receipts shared with the federal government. See P. Cuciti, H. Galper, &
R. Lucke, State Energy Revenues: A Potential Intergovernmental Problem, in 1981 ADvI-
SORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS.
States also receive royalties from minerals and energy produced on federally-owned
lands within their boundaries. The minimum federal royalty is 12.5% of the amount or
value of the mineral removed. 30 U.S.C. 226(c) (1976). Fifty percent of federal royalties are
allocated to the states. In fiscal 1978 states received $228 million in royalties from energy
produced on federally-owned land. P. Mieszkowski & E. Toder, supra note 5, at 18-19.
7. The potential receipts are enormous. By 1990 Wyoming is expected to collect a sur-
plus of $350 million per year from coal severance taxes. See Transcript from the MacNeil/
Lehrer Report, Energy Civil War, at 2 (August 29, 1980).
8. See C. McClure, Tax Exporting and the Commerce Clause: Reflections on Common-
wealth Edison (1981) (unpublished paper) [hereinafter cited as C. McClure, Tax Export-
ing]. McClure suggests that the extent of the tax export depends upon four considera-
tions-the market position of the state, the mobility of the taxed activity, the ability to
substitute a product for the taxed product, and the elasticity of demand. McClure, The
Interstate Exporting of State and Local Taxes: Estimates for 1962, 20 NAV'L TAX J. 49, 56-
57 & n.27 (1967) [hereinafter cited as McClure, Interstate Exporting]. McClure submits
that although taxes generally are not susceptible to total exportation, McClure, Economic
Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 257, 259
(1978), a mineral severance tax is an exception if demand for the mineral is highly inelastic
and if the taxing state dominates the supply. McClure, Interstate Exporting, supra, at 59.
9. New Mexico increased the rate of its severance tax three times in 1980. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 7-26-1 to -11 (1980 & Supp. 1982). In 1975 Montana increased its severance tax
on surface mined coal from $.34 per ton to 30% of the contract sales price less any produc-
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ergy-consuming states have attempted to reap the benefit from
these energy revenues by taxing oil companies.10 These taxing
schemes have resulted in a substantial wealth transfer from the en-
ergy-poor states to the energy-rich states as well as the potential
for significant tax exportation by the producing states.
This Article examines the use of state energy taxes and the
widening economic disparity between energy-producing and con-
suming states. In addressing these newly developing regional en-
ergy problems, part H of the Article discusses the specific types of
taxes levied on energy resources and the impact of these taxes on
energy producers and consumers. Part III of the Article discusses
the potential constitutional problems in state taxation of energy
resources in the context of the commerce, equal protection, due
process, privileges and immunities, and supremacy clauses. Finally,
part IV of the Article explores possible solutions to reduce the
financial disparities between energy-producing and energy-con-
suming states, federal intervention in state tax schemes, coopera-
tion between the states, a federal revenue sharing program to ben-
efit energy consuming states, and energy independence for
consuming states.
II. DESCRIPTION AND EFFECT OF STATE TAXES ON ENERGY
RESOuRCES
A. Severance Tax
A severance tax is an excise tax levied on the amount of a nat-
ural resource extracted from the lands and waters within a state's
jurisdiction, including federal lands within a state. The actual tax
levied by the state may bear a variety of names-license tax, con-
servation tax, production tax-but each is a tax on the extraction
of resources from the ground.1" A severance tax, unlike a specific
user tax,12 is not designed to be a quid pro quo for a particular
benefit or service rendered by the state. Rather, it is a general rev-
tion taxes the seller passed on to the buyer-an effective rate of approximately 21% or
$2.05 per ton at 1979 prices. Wyoming followed with tax hikes in 1975 and 1977 to a statu-
tory rate of 10.5%-approximately $1.02 per ton. P. Cuciti, H. Galper & R. Lucke, supra
note 6, at 7.
For a description of various taxing schemes, see infra Part H.
10. See infra notes 254-66 and accompanying text.
11. See Severance, Production Taxes, 2 ST. TAX GumE (CCH) 45-000 (Jan. 1979).
12. Specific user taxes, such as highway use taxes, are not revenue measures, but
rather charges or rentals for the use of a public facility. P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LimrrTIONs
ON STATE AND LocAL TAxATION § 2:6, at 31 (1981).
[Vol. 36:55
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enue tax that is used not for any specific end, but to defer the
overall social, environmental, and economic costs associated with
producing that natural resource. s A severance tax is usually ad
valorem-based on the value of the product-but it may also be
specific-based on the units of production.14 The tax is imposed on
the extraction of natural resources in the state, regardless of
whether the resources are shipped out of the state or whether the
firm extracting the resource is local or interstate. In most cases,
however, the burden or incidence of the tax is borne by out-of-
state residents because most of the natural resource is exported
out of the taxing state.1 5 Economic studies have shown that the
degree of exporting depends upon the monopolistic power of the
state, the extent of the cartelization by the producing states, the
mobility of various resources, international competition, natural
substitutability, government regulations, the prevalence of long-
term contracts, and transportation costs.1 6
States usually impose severance taxes, but local governments
also can impose them. In addition, Indian tribes have jurisdiction
to impose severance taxes on resources extracted from their terri-
tories. Michigan imposed the first severance tax in 1846."' By
1982 thirty-three states had adopted some type of severance tax.19
13. Recently, states have placed large amounts of this revenue in trust funds. For ex-
ample, under the terms of a recent amendment to the Montana Constitution, at least 50%
of the revenues generated by mineral severance taxes must be paid into a permanent trust
fund. The principal of the fund may be appropriated only by a vote of three-fourths of the
members of each house of the legislature. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 5. One can argue that a
payment to this trust fund is to cover the cost of depleting a nonrenewable energy re-
source-perhaps a user fee. See supra note 12.
14. See, Severance, Production Taxes, ST. TAx GumE (CCH) 45-200 to -951 (Mar.
1982). Examples of states using this specific method include Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 47.633 (West 1970); Montana, MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-101, -103 (1977); and Wyoming,
Wyo. STAT. § 39-6-302 (1977 & Supp. 1981).
15. See C. McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 8, at 7.
16. See supra note 8.
17. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 § 16, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1963), authorizes any
tribe residing on a reservation to adopt a constitution and bylaws subject to the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior. In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 102 S. Ct. 379 (1982), the
Court upheld a severance tax levied by the tribe and authorized in the tribe's constitution.
See also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 230 (1982) (court held on the facts that a state cannot tax extraction on Indian lands
when it conflicts with a tribal severance tax).
18. T. Stinson, State Taxation of Mineral Deposits and Production, at 6 (U.S. Dep't.
of Agriculture-U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency 1977).
19. Statement of Shirley Kallek, Associate Director for Economic Fields, Bureau of
the Census, Department of Commerce, before the Senate Intergovernmental Relations Sub-
committee on the Commerce Clause and Severance Taxes, at 1 (July 15, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Statement of S. Kallek].
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Severance taxes are imposed on resources such as oil, gas, coal,
timber, copper, potash, sand, gravel, uranium, molybdendum, ver-
miculite, sulfur, dolomite, limestone, iron, taconite, and salt. In
fiscal 1981 severance taxes accounted for 4.3% of all state taxes
collected.2 0 The total severance taxes collected by all states in
fiscal 1981 was $6.4 billion, 124% more than was collected in fiscal
1979.21 Approximately 84% of severance tax collections in 1980
came from oil and gas production; an additional 8% of the receipts
came from coal production.22
Alaska, Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Montana, Wyoming, and
New Mexico are the states with abundant oil, gas, and coal
reserves,2 s and each of these states imposes a severance tax.24 In all
but one of these states, an increasing portion of the total tax gener-
ated in the state is from severance taxes. For example, in 1980 sev-
erance taxes represented 35.2% of total tax collections for Alaska,
27.2% for Wyoming, 21.9% for Louisiana, 21.7% for Montana,
24.6% for Oklahoma, 23.1% for New Mexico, and 22.6% for
Texas.25 This represented an increase over 1970 of 22.7% in
Alaska, 22.1% in Wyoming, 18% in Montana, 14.5% in Oklahoma,
10.2% in New Mexico, and 8.8% in Texas.26 Only in Louisiana did
the proportion of severance taxes to total tax revenues decrease.27
B. Property Tax
Natural resources are directly or indirectly subject to a num-
ber of property taxes. First, a tax may be imposed on the land
where the resource is extracted or on the improvements made to
the land that enhance its value or increase the profits from the
resources.2 8 Second, a tax may be imposed on the mineral itself. In
20. P. Cuciti, H. Galper, R. Lucke, supra note 6, at 18. This was up from 3.1% in
1980. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Of the 33 states imposing severance taxes in 1980, the following eight states-in
order from highest to lowest-accounted for 87% of the total receipts from severance taxes:
Texas, Louisiana, Alaska, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Kentucky, Florida, and Wyoming. See S.
Kallek, supra note 19, at 2.
24. See Severance, Production Taxes, 2 ST. TAx GUIDE (CCH) 1145-201 to -955 (Mar.
1982).
25. See S. Kallek, supra note 19, at Table 4.
26. Id.
27. In Louisiana this decrease was eight percent. Id.
28. Alaska, ALAsKA STAT. § 43.56.020 (1977), Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47.643




some states taxing authorities use the gross value of current pro-
duction to determine the assessment of mineral properties.29 In
other states an attempt is made to assess mineral reserves at their
market value without regard to whether the reserves are being de-
veloped.30 Last, a personal property tax may be imposed on the
machinery and equipment used to extract the minerals from the
ground or to transport the minerals off the land.3" Both state and
local governments can impose these three types of ad valorem
taxes. Because property taxes do not account for as much revenue
as severance taxes, many states use severance taxes in lieu of all
other ad valorem taxes that they could impose on energy re-
sources.3 2 In part, the preference for severance taxes is due to the
administrative problems associated with property taxes. Complex
valuation and assessment procedures are necessary to calculate and
monitor the tax effectively. Assessors may be unable to assess ac-
curately energy reserves because often the essential data is availa-
ble only to the developer of the mineral. Economic studies show
that, like severance taxes, consumers of the energy resource usually
bear the burden of ad valorem property taxes.3 3 Thus, energy-rich
states through various forms of property taxing schemes poten-
tially can export the burden of the tax to out-of-state consumers.
C. Corporate Income Tax
Many states impose a gross income or a net income tax on
corporations engaged in business within the state, including busi-
nesses engaged in natural resources exploitation.3 4 Unlike sever-
ance and property taxes, which are not imposed on activities
29. Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 84-301 (1977), New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-
36-23 (1978), and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 39-2-202 (1977), utilize this method.-Wyoming
taxes the gross value of production until development is complete. Once mining has begun,
the land is exempt from tax and production is taxed. Montana's assessment is determined
on the basis of either gross or net proceeds. New Mexico's assessed value is one-third of
taxable value, which is defined as 150% of annual gross product, less royalties.
30. Texas, TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.17 (Vernon 1979), and California, CAL. REV. &
TAx. CODE § 402.5 (West 1970), utilize this method.
31. Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 84-901-02 (1977), and New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-34-1 to -34-8 (1980), utilize this method. Oklahoma, on the other hand, exempts
from tax much of the personal property used in mining. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68 § 2420
(West 1966). See Severance, Production Taxes, 2 ST. TAX GUIDE (CCH) at 1 45-665, -590
(June 1982).
32. See T. Stinson, supra note 18, at 6.
33. See C. McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 8, at 21.
34. In many states income is defined the same as income for federal tax purposes. See
2 ST. & Loc. TAX SERV. (P-H) (chart at 11 221) (Nov. 22, 1982).
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outside the state, states often impose these taxes on out-of-state
earnings. When a firm is engaged in a unitary business that ex-
tends into a number of states a state may employ formula appor-
tionment to determine the portion of the firm's nationwide income
upon which it can levy the state tax. 5 To derive the tax base, the
state multiplies the nationwide income by an apportionment frac-
tion-typically the corporation's payroll, property, and sales occur-
ring within the state over the company's total United States pay-
roll, property, and sales.," States may be able to obtain even
greater revenues by choosing worldwide income instead of nation-
wide income as the starting point to which the apportionment frac-
tion is applied, 7 or by varying the way in which payroll, property,
and sales are determined.
38
Consuming states using the unitary method of taxing income
can capture a part of a corporation's revenues generated from ac-
tivities outside the taxing state." Thus, the taxing state can apply
the apportionment formula to a base that includes all profits from
the exploration, development, production, and marketing of the
35. P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 9:18. The base amount may be worldwide income,
national income, income from operations integrated with the state, or income from a sepa-
rate functional or geographic area.
36. The apportionment formula is as follows:
(sales + payroll + property) in state
(sales + payroll + property) nationwide
Assume the sum of in-state sales, payroll, and property for corporation X is $1,000,000.
Assume the sum of nationwide sales, payroll, and property is $10,000,000. Corporation X's




tax base would be: $20 million
10 million or $2 million.
37. In the example above, if the state substituted the corporation's worldwide income
for its nationwide income, the tax would increase-assuming, of course, that the corpora-
tion's total worldwide income was greater than its total national income.
38. A producing state potentially could transfer a significant measure of its tax burden
to other states by assigning the sale to the point of origin rather than to the point of desti-
nation. Assigning the sale to the point of origin operates like a severance tax on the energy
resource because the state taxes the sale, although the energy resource is transported to
another state. Most states, however, assign sales to the point of destination. The point of
destination method allows a state to tax the sales receipts from those energy resources that
either remain in or are transported into the state and are sold there. Forty-two states assign
sales to the state of destination. J. HELLERsTmN & W. HELLERSTIN, STATE AND LocAL TAXA-
TION 459 (1978).
39. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:4.
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energy resource. 40 By increasing the base the state can increase the
amount of tax revenue. Consuming states also may use point of
destination rather than point of origin to determine the sales part
of the apportionment formula. Such a modification of the appor-
tionment rules will increase the tax revenues of the state.41 In fact,
economic studies have shown that consuming states that use point
of destination generate more revenues from their corporate income
taxes than those states that use point of origin. 2
Energy-rich states that use formula apportionment may calcu-
late the sales factor by point of origin rather than by point of des-
tination.4 3 For states that consume little of what they produce,
such a modification of the apportionment rules will increase the
tax revenues of the state. Economic studies have shown that en-
ergy producing states that use the point of origin approach gener-
ate more revenues from their corporate income taxes than those
states that use the point of destination method."
An increasing number of states use the worldwide income of a
corporation as the base to which they apply the formula. Thus, a
state determines a taxpayer corporation's apportionable tax base
by combining its income with the income of its domestic and for-
eign affiliates.' 5 This method of taxation increases the base to
which the apportionment fraction is applied, and, thus, increases
the amount of tax owed to the state.'8
Several states do not use the traditional income apportion-
ment scheme. Instead these states employ a separate accounting
method in which they use one or more activities of a particular
industry-pipeline, production, or refining-to measure taxable in-
come.47 Under this type of accounting a certain functional or geo-
40. For example, Exxon operates only its Marketing department in Wisconsin. Under
the unitary method of accounting Wisconsin can tax Exxon a portion of the income gener-
ated by its Exploration, Production, and Refining departments, which operate outside Wis-
consin. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Rev., 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
41. Under the point of destination accounting of sales the state taxes the receipts from
sales of all goods transported into the state. Naturally, a consuming state will benefit from
the destination approach; an energy-producing state, on the other hand, would increase its
revenues by adopting the point of origin approach. See supra note 38.
42. See C. McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 8, at 21.
43. See supra note 38.
44. See C. McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 8, at 21.
45. See supra notes 36-37.
46. Id.
47. In this era of the multistate corporation the separate accounting method often is
not practical. Under the separate accounting method the business operations of a multistate
corporation within the taxing state are treated as though separate and distinct from the
business operations outside the state. In many instances this approach is not practical be-
1983]
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graphic area of an interstate business is treated separately from
the rest of the business. A state computes taxable income as if the
activities of the business were confined to that functional or geo-
graphic area. Therefore, this approach may require the firm or
group of firms operating in the state to treat certain activities in
the taxing state, or those functions that are profitable, as separate
entities. The separate accounting method is the prevailing method
for reporting income from oil production.48
Energy-producing states that employ the separate accounting
method of taxation usually will tax upstream operations. Alaska,
for example, utilizes separate accounting to measure the taxable
income of oil and gas companies resulting from production and
pipeline transportation.4 The consuming states, on the other
hand, are more likely to employ the separate accounting method to
downstream operations, such as refining.50 Although debates con-
tinue on who bears the burden of these types of taxes, 51 economic
studies show that the incidence of the separate accounting method
of tax is similar to that of a severance tax if certain deductions are
disallowed or do not correspond to actual expenses incurred.52 In
such a case the incidence of the tax is actually on the consumer. If,
on the other hand, the deductions correspond to actual expenses
incurred, the incidence is similar to the regular income tax.53
Income taxes, like severance and property taxes, capture some
share of the increasing tax revenues generated by energy opera-
tions. Although statistics are not available to determine exactly
how much revenue states realize from the income taxes on energy
exploitation, income statement data from the Federal Trade Com-
mission from 1975 and 1980 show that after adjustments for infla-
tion, net income before taxes increased 68% for the mining indus-
try and 48.2% for manufacturers of petroleum and coal products."
cause a corporation is unable to determine accurately the amount of income derived from a
particular operation. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income From a Multistate
Business, 13 VAND. L. REv. 21, 62 (1959).
An energy-producing state, however, has an incentive to utilize the separate accounting
method for energy-related businesses because of the substantial amount of income derived
from operations in the state.
48. See Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business Con-
cept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAx L. REv. 171, 191 (1970).
49. ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.19, 43.20.021 (Supp. 1980).
50. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
51. See C. McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 8, at 20.
52. Id.
53. Id,
54. P. Cuciti, H. Galper, R. Lucke, supra note 6, at 21 (quoting statistics in U.S. FED-
[Vol. 36:55
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Although imprecise, these statistics indicate that tax revenues gen-
erated from the income taxes of energy-related firms are becoming
increasingly important.
D. Other State Taxes and Taxing Schemes
In addition to severance, property, and income taxes, states
impose numerous excise taxes. Excise taxes are based on the exer-
cise of a privilege, the doing of an act, or the engaging in an occu-
pation.5 5 Severance taxes are perhaps the most common type of
excise tax affecting energy resources. Other excise taxes, however,
are also important. For example, a common form of excise tax is a
tax imposed on the privilege of doing business in the state.56 Re-
gardless of its name-gross receipts tax, franchise tax, occupation
tax, or license tax-these taxes usually are measured by the gross
receipts derived from the activities within the state.5 7 States im-
pose privilege taxes on oil and gas companies in addition to other
types of business. For example, West Virginia utilizes gross receipt
taxes instead of severance taxes.58 Many states have special excise
taxes that relate to particular aspects of natural resource exploita-
tion. New Mexico, for example, had an electrical generation tax.59
Most states have a combination of several excise taxes that affect
natural resources. Not infrequently, a state may have in addition
to a severance tax several other excise taxes, such as a tax on min-
eral production and a corporate license tax.60
Sales and use taxes also are forms of excise taxes. Sales taxes
are imposed on the sale of goods and services within the state. 1
Use taxes complement sales taxes. They are imposed on the use,
storage, withdrawal, or consumption of a tangible good, and usu-
ally are applied only to a good purchased outside the state.62 Al-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION, QUARTERLY FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MANUFACTURING, MINING AND
TRADE CORPORATIONS, (Wash., D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office)).
55. Litigation often results over whether a particular tax is a property tax or an excise
tax because many state constitutions contain limitations on either property taxes or excise
taxes. See United States v. Nevada Tax Comm'n, 291 F. Supp. 530, 534 (D. Nev. 1968).
56. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:17.
57. Id. § 8.1, at 420; see C. McClure, Tax Exporting, supra note 8, at 22.
58. W. VA. CODE § 11-15-7 (1974). See Statement of S. Kallek, supra note 19, at 3.
59. The legislature repealed N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-80 (1978) effective July 1, 1982.
1982 N.M. Laws, ch. 18, § 27. See infra text accompanying notes 229-33.
60. For example, Montana has a severance tax, a tax on mineral production, a corpora-
tion license tax, a mining property tax, a mining property tax, a mining equipment tax, and
a coal retailer's tax. See supra notes 10-54 and accompanying text.
61. P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 10:1, at 577.
62. Id. § 10:1, at 578.
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though these types of taxes generally do not directly affect energy
resources, they may have a substantial indirect effect in some
cases. For example, Louisiana imposed a "first use" tax on any nat-
ural gas brought into Louisiana that previously was not subjected
to taxation by another state or the United States."s This tax, which
raised substantial revenues 4 and burdened out-of-state consum-
ers,6 5 subsequently was struck down by the Supreme Court."'
In addition to the great variety of taxes affecting natural re-
sources, great differences exist within each taxing scheme and be-
tween various taxing schemes. States may provide for credits, ex-
emptions, and deductions that can modify the incidence and effect
of the tax. For example, some taxing schemes provide for exemp-
tions or credits for residents, which can result in a transfer of the
tax burden from residents to nonresidents.6 e Similarly, different
taxing schemes within a state may be interrelated to cause a dis-
criminatory effect.68 Consequently, a careful examination of state
taxes on energy resources requires a discussion of not only all of
the various kinds of taxes, but also the interrelationship of the tax-
ing schemes within the taxing state.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON ENERGY TAXATION
The Constitution contains five provisions under which a tax-
payer may challenge an allegedly discriminatory state tax: the
commerce clause, the due process clause, the equal protection
clause, the privileges and immunities clause, and the supremacy
clause. The Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady
69
set forth the issues presented under the commerce clause: (1) Does
a sufficient minimum connection or nexus exist between the taxed
activity and the tax? (2) Is the tax properly apportioned? (3) Does
the tax discriminate against or burden interstate commerce? and
63. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 47:1301-47:1307 (West Supp. 1981).
64. Estimated annual revenues ranged from $150 million to $275 million. See Mary-
land v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 731 & n.7 (1981); Comment, The Louisiana First-Use Tax:
Does It Violate the Commerce Clause?, 53 TuL. L. REV. 1474, 1474 (1979).
65. Ninety-eight percent of the gas that entered Louisiana from operations on the
outer continental shelf eventually was sold to out-of-state consumers. Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. 725, 729 (1981).
66. Id.; see infra notes 155-76 and accompanying text.
67. The Louisiana first use tax statute and other Louisiana statutes provided for a
number of exemptions from and credits for the first use tax where the tax, for the most part,
did not burden Louisiana consumers. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1981).
68. See infra notes 155-76 and accompanying text.
69. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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(4) Is the tax fairly related to the services provided by the state?"0
Similarly, the due process clause requires that the taxed activity
bear a rational relationship to the taxing state and that the state
fairly apportion the tax.7 1 Further, the due process clause requires
that a state not take the taxpayer's property unfairly and without
proper compensation. Under the equal protection clause the issues
presented are: (1) Does the tax have a legitimate purpose?72 and
(2) Could the lawmakers conceivably believe that the use of the
challenged classification would promote that purpose?73 The privi-
leges and immunities clause, which affords protection only to indi-
viduals, not corporations 7 4 prohibits discriminatory tax treatment
of nonresidents unless the discriminatory tax bears a reasonable
relationship to a problem presented by nonresidents. 5 Last, under
the supremacy clause the issues presented are: (1) Did Congress
expressly preempt state action?7 6 (2) Does congressional action
clearly and unmistakably show that Congress intended to super-
sede state action?77 and (3) Does the state statute conflict with a
federal enactment and stand as a direct obstacle to its execution or
purpose?78 This Article discusses each of these constitutional
limitations.
A. Commerce Clause
Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution states
that Congress has the power "to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes. '7 9 Although this language appears to address only the af-
firmative powers of Congress, it also speaks to the negative restric-
70. Id. at 277-78.
71. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967);
Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949); P. HARTmAN, supra note
12, § 2:3, at 19-20.
72. P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 3:2, at 139.
73. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364-65 (1973); P. HART-
uAN, supra note 12, § 3:1, at 135-36.
74. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 259 (1898); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
178 (1869).
75. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U.S. 60, 79 (1920); P. HARTmAN, supra note 12, §§ 4:2-4:3.
76. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941); see generally J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw 267-
79 (1978).
77. See supra note 76.
78. Id.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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tions on the states' power to invade federal jurisdiction. The cases
under the commerce clause fall into three categories: (1) Those
cases dealing with Congress' affirmative power to pass legislation;
(2) those cases dealing with the state's power to pass certain regu-
latory measures; and (3) those cases dealing with the state's power
to pass certain taxation measures. The latter two categories relate
to the negative or dormant implications of the commerce clause."0
Until Complete Auto Transit v. Brady"" and Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana82 courts analyzed the validity under the
commerce clause of state taxes on natural resources by a mechani-
cal test set forth in the "Heisler trilogy" cases of the 1920's.83 The
Court in a long series of decisions had held that because of the
commerce clause, states lacked the power to tax interstate and for-
eign commerce since the power of Congress over such commerce
was exclusive.84 This rationale, therefore, compelled courts to de-
termine what was interstate and foreign commerce for tax pur-
poses. In making this determination courts looked to whether the
taxed activity was local in nature or in interstate commerce. If lo-
cal, the taxing authority could tax the activity, and the commerce
clause was inoperative-even if the activity affected interstate
commerce. If nonlocal or interstate, the activity was immune from
direct state taxation. Thus, mining,85 manufacturing," and agricul-
80. On its face the commerce clause is simply a conferral of power on Congress to
regulate commerce among the states. The commerce clause, however, is not only a grant of
authority to Congress, but also a significant, independent limitation on state power. Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); see Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism,
the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 Tax. L. REv. 71 (1980);
Blumstein, Some Intersections of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism:
The Case of Discriminatory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax-Exempt
Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1978); Browde & DuMars, State Taxation of Natural Re-
source Extraction and the Commerce Clause: Federalism's Modern Frontier, 60 ORE. L.
REV. 7 (1981); Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YA. L.J. 425
(1982); Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 47 (1981); Schwartz, Commerce, the States, and the
Burger Court, 74 Nw. U.L. Rav. 409 (1979); Tusimet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 125; Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U.
CH. L. REv. 487 (1981).
81. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
82. 453 U.S. 699 (1981).
83. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,
262 U.S. 172 (1923); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
84. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933); Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v.
Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887);
see P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:18, at 101.
85. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
86. American Mfg. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919).
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tural production, 87 were local and prefatory to interestate com-
merce and, therefore, within the exclusive control of the state. The
selling and shipping of goods already mined and produced to cus-
tomers in another state, however, was interstate commerce.
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co."s a stockholder in Thomas
Colliery Company brought suit to challenge the constitutionality of
a Pennsylvania severance tax on anthracite coal and to enjoin de-
fendant company and its directors from complying with the tax.89
Plaintiff claimed that the tax was a collection of tribute from other
states, imposed because Pennsylvania had a monopoly on anthra-
cite coal and exported most of that coal to other states.90 Further,
taxpayer argued that the tax discriminated against interstate com-
merce, which the commerce clause prohibited."1 The Supreme
Court concluded that the tax was on the local activity of severing
natural resources from the earth and did not concern interstate
commerce. The Court stated:
The reach and consequences of the contention repel its acceptance. If the
possibility, or, indeed, certainty of exportation of a product or article from a
State determines it to be in interstate commerce before the commencement
of its movement from the State, it would seem to follow that it is in such
. commerce from the instant of its growth or production, and in the case of
coals, as they lie in the ground. The result would be curious. It would nation-
alize all industries, it would nationalize and withdraw from state jurisdiction
and deliver to federal commercial control the fruits of California and the
South, the wheat of the West and its meats, the cotton of the South, the
shoes of Massachusetts and the woolen industries of other States, at the very
inception of their production or growth, that is, the fruits unpicked, the cot-
ton and wheat ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet "on the hoof," wool
yet unshorn and coal yet unmined, because they are in varying percentages
destined for and surely to be exported to States other than those of their
production."
The Court followed this mechanical rule in Oliver Iron Mining
Co. v. Lord,93 a case in which taxpayers challenged a Minnesota
occupation tax upon "'[e]very person engaged in the business of
mining or producing iron ore or other ores' within the State. '94 As
87. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259-60 (1922).
88. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
89. The tax statute provided for a 11 % tax on the value of each ton of anthracite
coal "mined, 'washed, or screened, or otherwise prepared for market' . . . ." Id. at 253.
90. Id. at 258. Nine northeastern states joined plaintiff in the suit.
91. Id. at 252-53.
92. Id. at 259-60; see also Canton R.R. Co. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 515 (1951) (similar
conclusion concerning tax that implicated both the commerce clause and the import-export
clause).
93. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
94. Id. at 174-75. The tax was determined from the "value of the ore at the place it is
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in Heisler, taxpayers asserted that mining, if not actually a part of
interstate commerce, was connected so closely with it that to tax
mining was to burden interstate commerce.9 5 Further, most of the
iron ore was destined for out-of-state customers.", The Court, how-
ever, rejected the taxpayers' claim:
Plainly the facts do not support the contention. Mining is not interstate com-
merce, but, like manufacturing is a local business subject to local regulation
and taxation .... Its character in this regard is intrinsic, is not affected by
the intended use or disposal of the product, is not controlled by contractual
engagements, and persists even though the business be conducted in close
connection with interstate commerce.
9 7
In the last case of the trilogy, Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall,93
taxpayer challenged a West Virginia annual privilege tax imposed
on "every person engaging. . . in the business of mining and pro-
ducing for sale, profit, or use, any coal, oil, natural gas, limestone,
sand or other mineral product... ." The Court held that the tax
did not violate the commerce clause because production was a
purely local activity, and the tax was imposed on oil and gas at the
wellhead before it entered the stream of interstate commerce.
100
The Court followed the "mechanical test" established in the
Heisler trilogy as recently as 1961 and 1969. In Alaska v. Arctic
Maid 01 California and Washington taxpayers challenged an Alaska
license tax of four percent of the value of salmon caught in Alas-
kan territorial waters. The salmon were caught in Alaska by
"catcher boats," which taxpayers owned or had under contract,
and then transferred to taxpayers' freezer ships outside of Alaskan
territorial waters. Taxpayers froze the salmon aboard the freezer
ships and eventually returned to Washington, where the salmon
were canned. The Supreme Court held that the license tax on
freezer ships, as applied to salmon taken in Alaska's territorial wa-
ters, was not invalid as a burden on interstate commerce:
The process of gathering fish either through the catcher boats that are part of
respondents' fleet or through independent operators is a "local activity" in a
vivid sense of the term. We see no reason why our cases involving the taking
of shrimp and the extraction of ore are not dispositive of this controversy.
The Oliver Iron case is indeed a first cousin of the present case. Here, as
'brought to the surface of the earth . ' Id. at 175.
95. Id. at 177.
96. Less than two percent of the ore was sold and used in Minnesota. Id. at n.2.
97. Id. at 178-79 (citations omitted).
98. 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
99. Id. at 285-86 n.3.
100. Id. at 288.
101. 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
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there, the tax is an occupation tax. Here, as there, the market for the product
obtained locally is interstate, the taking being a step in a process leading to
an interstate market.
10 2
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Dunbar-Stanley Studies v.
Alabama 0 3 distinguished between local activity and interstate ac-
tivity. In Dunbar-Stanley Alabama taxed photograph galleries and
persons engaged in photography for each county, town, or city in
which they worked. For a photographer or gallery at a fixed loca-
tion, the maximum tax was twenty-five dollars per year. For a
transient photographer, the tax was five dollars per week for each
location in which he worked. Taxpayer, an out-of-state
photography firm, which maintained no office, place of business, or
inventory in Alabama, contracted with J.C. Penney stores in Ala-
bama periodically to send photographers to the stores for a short
time. Photographers utilized factilities and advertising furnished
by the department stores, took pictures, and sent the exposed film
to an office in North Carolina that developed, finished, and re-
turned the film to the department stores in Alabama. Taxpayer
challenged the transient photographer tax assessed against it. The
Supreme Court held that the tax was constitutionally permissible:
It could hardly be suggested that if J.C. Penney had set up its own resident
or transient photography studies, using its own employees, such a photogra-
phy business would have been exempt from State licensing merely because it
chose to send the exposed film out of of the State for processing. The extrac-
tion of a natural resource within a state is not immunized from state taxation
merely because, once extracted, the product will immediately be shipped out
of the State for processing and sale to consumers.104
102. Id. at 203-04 (citation omitted); see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286
U.S. 165 (1932) (generation of electricity from waterpower within the state is a local activity;
transmission of electricity over wires from the generator to consumers in another state is an
interstate activity).
103. 393 U.S. 537 (1969).
104. Id. at 541. The Court's somewhat tortured inquiry into whether the taxed activity
was local or interstate was the result of the "tax-free haven" approach to interstate com-
merce. See Hellerstein, Foreword State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335, 337 (1976). Thus, the Court in Spector Motor Service
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), held that states could not tax the privilege of transacting
interstate business. This blanket prohibition against "direct" taxation on interstate com-
merce gradually ceded to the notion that interstate commerce legitimately could be ex-
pected to share the costs of running government. "It was not the purpose of the commerce
clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax
burden even though it increases the cost of doing the business." Western Live Stock v.
Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938). In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959), the Court held that a state may tax directly the net
income from interstate business. "[I]t is axiomatic that the founders did not intend to im-
munize such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of the state government in
return for the benefits it derives from within the State." Id. at 461-62. Thus, the Court
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The local versus interstate distinction raised in these tax cases
appears to conflict with the practical effects test used in post-New
Deal cases addressing Congress' affirmative powers under the com-
merce clause.10 5 The Court's inquiry in challenges to federal power
under the commerce clause is whether the activity sought to be
regulated affects interstate commerce. 1°6 If the activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce, then Congress has the power to
regulate. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court in Wickard v. Fil-
burn'0 7 held that Congress could regulate the agricultural activity
of a farmer growing wheat for personal consumption only. In Fry v.
United States °s the Court concluded that the activities of state
employees were subject to federal control. Similarly, in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association °9 the Court
held that the regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to pro-
tect interstate commerce. These cases indicate that Congress' au-
thority to regulate commerce is extensive and applies to local ac-
became less concerned with whether the incidence of a tax fell on interstate commerce di-
rectly or indirectly. See Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Standard
Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); Hellerstein, State Taxa-
tion of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel
and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. RPv. 149 (1976). Finally, the Court in 1977 expressly over-
ruled Spector in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
In Complete Auto Transit Mississippi levied a privilege tax on doing business within
the state. Taxpayer was a Michigan corporation that transported motor vehicles by motor
carrier for General Motors, which manufactured the vehicles outside of Mississippi and
shipped them by rail into the state. Taxpayer loaded vehicles onto its trucks for transporta-
tion elsewhere in the state. At the outset, the Court assumed that this transportation was in
interstate commerce. Id. at 276 n.4. The Court rejected the formalistic Spector rule and
stated that the basic inquiry is whether the results from a particular tax are "forbidden by
the Commerce Clause." Id. at 285. The Court concluded that a tax does not violate the
commerce clause if "the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the tax-
ing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided by the State." Id. at 279.
105. Affirmative commerce clause decisions have evolved in two lines. Compare Hous-
ton, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (congressional authority
extends to all matters having a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce) with
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Congress has power under commerce
clause to reach local economic activities only if activity has a "direct" rather than "indirect"
effect on interstate commerce). Under the Knight approach the Court distinguished be-
tween manufacturing and commerce. The former had only an indirect effect on interstate
commerce and, thus, was beyond the reach of Congress. See Blumstein, supra note 80, at
486 n.53.
106. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
107. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
108. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
109. 452 U.S. 264 (1981); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (surface coal
mining on prime farmland affects interstate commerce in agricultural products).
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tivity as long as that activity affects interstate commerce. Until
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana110 uncertainty existed
about whether this practical effects standard would apply to the
negative restrictions on the state's power to tax."'
Montana in 1975 raised its maximum severance tax on coal
extraction to thirty percent of sales price. 12 Four Montana coal
companies and eleven out-of-state consumers of Montana coal
challenged the severance tax under the commerce and supremacy
clauses and sought refunds of over $5.4 million in taxes paid under
protest and an injunction against further collection of the tax.
The trial court upheld the tax and dismissed the com-
plaints. '1 3 On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed,
'14
concluding "that the severance of coal here is a taxable event that
precedes entry into interstate commerce" and is "not an interstate
activity" and that, in such circumstances, the commerce clause im-
poses no limit on the power of the states to tax.1 5 Alternatively,
the Montana court held that even if the commerce clause did ap-
ply, the tax nevertheless met the four-pronged Complete Auto
Transit test. '6
In the United States Supreme Court taxpayers argued, as a
threshold matter, that the Supreme Court should abandon the
mechanical test of Heisler, which excluded mining from the scope
of commerce clause protection.1 1 7 The Court noted that Heisler
110. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
111. But cf. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979) ("The definition of
'commerce' is the same when relied on to strike down or restrict state legislation as when
relied on to support some exertion of federal control or regulation.").
112. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 15-35-1-1 to -111 (1981). The tax is levied at rates depend-
ing on the value, energy content, and method of extraction of the coal. The maximum tax is
30% of the contract sales price, which is defined as "the price of coal extracted and pre-
pared for shipment f.o.b. mine,...." MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-102 (1981).
113. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 613 (1981).
114. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, 615 P.2d 847 (1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 609
(1981).
115. Id. at 854.
116. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text & note 104. Plaintiffs did not dis-
pute that the Montana tax met the first two parts of the Complete Auto Transit test.
Clearly, a substantial nexus existed between the taxed activity and the state. Moreover, the
severance of coal occurred exclusively in Montana. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, 615
P.2d at 855. The tax met the third part of the test-whether the tax discriminated against
interstate commerce-because the tax rate remained the same for coal sold both in-state
and out-of-state. Id. at 856. The Montana court also found that the tax passed the fourth
prong of the test-whether the tax was fairly related to services provided by the
state-because the coal producers enjoyed the "advantages of a civilized society" in Mon-
tana. Id.
117. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 614 (1981).
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was decided in an era when items in interstate commerce were im-
mune from direct state taxation.118 Thus, to preserve state taxing
authority, the Court had defined interstate commerce narrowly.
Since that time, however, the mechanical test of Heisler had given
way to a commerce clause analysis of state taxation that empha-
sized "the practical effect of a challenged tax."119 Thus, the Court
concluded that it no longer should treat mining as outside the pro-
tection of the commerce clause.120
The Court adopted the Montana Supreme Court's alternative
holding and held that the Montana tax survived commerce clause
scrutiny under the Complete Auto Transit test. The facially neu-
tral tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce within
the meaning of the third prong of the test even if the tax effec-
tively shifted state tax burdens to out-of-state coal consumers.121
Finally, the Court found that, because the tax was not flat but was
proportional to in-state business activity, it bore a "fair relation"
to services provided by the state. 22
This Article next explores in detail the four parts of the Com-
plete Auto Transit test. The importance of this test cannot be un-
derestimated because after Commonwealth Edison it controls the
validity under the commerce clause of all state taxes on natural
resources.
118. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 105.
119. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 615 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980)).
120. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 615-16. Although the Court
abandoned the Heisler approach, it likely would have reached the same result in Heisler
and its progeny under the Complete Auto Transit test.
121. Id. at 618. Taxpayers argued that the Montana tax discriminated against inter-
state commerce because 90% of Montana coal is shipped to out-of-state consumers. Id. at
617-18.
122. Id. at 628-29. The Court dismissed both of taxpayers' supremacy clause argu-
ments. First, taxpayers had argued that the Montana tax would alter the statutory formula
for the allocation between the state and federal government of "economic rents" from the
leasing of federal land for mining as provided by the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, ch.
85, 41 Stat. 437 (1920), amended by Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L.
94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). The
Court, however, noted that § 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980), explicitly authorized state severance taxes on federal lessees and did not
specify any limit on the taxes. Id. at 631.
Second, taxpayers argued that the Montana tax frustrated congressional policy, re-
flected in a myriad of statutes, favoring coal use, e.g., Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use
Act of 1978 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 8311(1) (Supp. IV 1980) (prohibits use of natural gas or
petroleum fuel by new electric powerplants). The Court concluded that only a specific fed-
eral intent to preempt an area, as opposed to a general "national policy," is sufficient to bar




A court will not sustain a state tax under the commerce clause
unless a substantial nexus exists between the state and the person,
property, or activity being taxed.123 The nexus criterion requires
that a sufficient contact, connection, tie, or link exist with the tax-
ing state to support the tax. If the state has given anything for
which it can ask a return, then the tax has a sufficient nexus. For
example, the state legitimately can ask for taxes to support local
services because it provides citizens the benefits of police and fire
protection and the use of roads and highways. Similarly, no nexus
problem arises in the case of a severance tax. As the Supreme
Court held in Commonwealth Edison, "there can be no argument
here that a substantial, in fact, the only nexus of the severance of
coal is established in [the state where it is extracted]. 12 4 Further,
a nexus problem usually does not arise for other excise taxes or for
property or income taxes. Courts have even held that the presence
of a single resident is sufficient to establish a nexus for purposes of
gross receipt taxes.12 5 For property taxes, a sufficient nexus exists
if the property used, stored, or otherwise comes to rest in the
state.1 26 If, however, the property merely is passing through the
state-as in the case of trucks, airplanes, or railroad cars-the con-
nection between the property and the benefits of state services
may not be sufficient to justify taxation.12 7 The nexus issue may
arise in the area of income taxation of multistate business. If an
out-of-state business activity is a separate business with no con-
tacts with the taxing state, then no nexus exists for that state to
include that income from that activity in the tax base. If, on the
other hand, the out-of-state business activity is part of a unitary
enterprise doing business within the state, then a sufficient nexus
exists.
1 28
123. See, e.g., National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551 (1977).
124. 453 U.S. at 617 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. State, 615 P.2d at 855).
125. See, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560
(1975); see also Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (Florida use tax upheld on
Georgia corporation having no office, property, or regular full-time employees in Florida);
infra note 190 and accompanying text.
126. See United Air Lines v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
127. See, e.g., Ozark Pipe Line Corp. v. Monier, 266 U.S. 555 (1925); United Fuel Gas
Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921).
But see Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949) (upholding tax on privi-
lege of shipping oil through the State).




The concept of apportionment prevents the multiple taxation
of a taxpayer whose activities affect interstate commerce. Appor-
tionment requires that some reasonable basis exist for calculating
the percentage of income or the percentage of the value of the
property that each state may tax.12 9 Apportionment, however, does
not require that the total tax burden on the taxpayer may not be
in excess of that which the taxpayer would bear if the taxpayer
were taxed only by one state. It requires only that the state not
extract from the taxpayer more than a fair share of the tax burden.
As with the problem of nexus, the problem of apportionment usu-
ally arises when the taxed person, property, or activity is in the
stream of interstate commerce. To the extent that the taxing state
directs the taxes in question at activities within that state, these
taxes are apportioned automatically; and the taxpayer has the dif-
ficult burden of showing multiple taxation. 130 For example, prop-
erty taxes are generally not apportioned."" Similarly, no issue of
fair apportionment arises for severance taxes because "'the sever-
ance can occur in no other state' and 'no other state can tax the
severance.' "132 Other excise taxes can create apportionment
problems if the tax is unrelated to actual activities of the taxpayer
within the state. In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Cal-
vert153 the Court concluded that a Texas occupation tax on "gath-
ering gas" was unconstitutional because the state imposed the tax
on the entire volume of gas.134 Similarly, the Court in General Mo-
129. See L. TRIE, AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-19 (1978).
130. A court is more likely to uphold taxes on net receipts than taxes on gross receipts
because they take into account the profitability of a business. See Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Bee-
ler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); Hartman, The Commerce Clause and the States' Power to Tax the
Oil and Gas Industry, INST. ON Om & GAS L. & TAX'N 387, 390-392 (1956).
131. This is logical because the real property to be taxed can exist only in one state,
which, thus, has the authority to levy taxes upon it.
132. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617 (1981) (quoting Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. State, 615 P.2d at 855). In addition, the Court requires that the
taxpayer show actual multiple tax burdens, not simply the risk of multiple tax burdens.
See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Department of Revenue v. Associ-
ation of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978); see P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:16,
at 82-83.
133. 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
134. Although the Court did not decide Calvert on this basis- since at the time of the
case, a state could not "directly" tax interstate commerce-later cases have interpreted it as
holding that the challenged tax was not properly apportioned. See Department of Revenue
v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 749 n.18 (1978).
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tors Corp. v. District of Columbia3 5 held that a city franchise tax
on General Motors was unconstitutional because the tax was mea-
sured exclusively by sales when all of the cars sold in the city were
manufactured elsewhere. In General Motors Corp. v. Washing-
ton,'e however, the Court held that a tax on the privilege of doing
business within the state, measured by gross receipts from all sales,
including out-of-state sales, was constitutional, even though the
taxpayer's in-state activities were not entirely responsible for those
sales.13 7 Similarly, the Court refused to invalidate a privilege tax
on an interstate railroad system that was based on the railroad's
intrastate travel mileage." 8' In general, as long as the state levys
the gross receipts, license, franchise, or other excise tax on the
value of the services performed within the state, the tax is appor-
tioned properly and multiple burdens do not occur.
1 3 9
The apportionment issue arises most frequently in the income
tax area. Clearly, a business engaged in interstate commerce
should not be required to pay income taxes in more than one state
on its total income. In Nippert v. City of Richmond14 0 the Court
held that an unapportioned tax on the total gross earnings of an
interstate business was unconstitutional because it was unrelated
to the amount of solicited business actually done within the state.
The Court stated that imposition of similar taxes by other states
could burden the interstate business and eventually destroy it.1
41
The Supreme Court generally has taken the view that a state may
tax income from activity generated in another state or abroad if
the intrastate and extrastate activities form part of a single unitary
business.142 Thus, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes14 3
the Court upheld a Vermont corporate income tax that reached
dividends from Mobil's subsidiaries and affiliates abroad because
Mobil failed to show "that the income was earned in the course of
activities unrelated to the sale of petroleum products in that
135. 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
136. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
137. Id. at 441.
138. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
139. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734
(1978).
140. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
141. Id. at 423-24.
142. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1942); Ford Motor Co. v.
Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331, 336 (1939); cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272
(1978).
143. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
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State.' 144 The Court noted that Mobil's foreign activities were part
of its integrated petroleum business that operated in Vermont and
not a discrete and separate operation. 145 Similarly, in Exxon Corp.
v. Department of Revenue146 the Court treated Exxon's seven
functional operating departments as a single unitary business, even
though only the Marketing department was located within Wiscon-
sin. 147 The Court reasoned that the marketing activity in Wiscon-
sin was related sufficiently to the other three Exxon departments
to make Wisconsin's tax legitimate.
148
Recently, however, in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com-
mission 49 the Court limited the application of the single unitary
business concept. In ASARCO the Court struck down a corporate
income tax that Idaho had levied on intangible income received by
an out-of-state corporation, which was mining silver in Idaho, from
four subsidiary corporations that had no connection with Idaho. 50
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell found that the tax vio-
lated the due process clause because the parent corporation and its
subsidiaries were not a single unitary business and, hence, the
Idaho levy improperly reached across its borders.' 5' The Court
reached a similar result in F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and
Revenue Department.52 Because the foreign subsidiaries of the
Woolworth retail store chain were not functionally integrated with
the domestic parent corporation and did not share a centralized
management with the parent, New Mexico's taxation of foreign
subsidiaries' dividends violated the due process clause. 53 As in
ASARCO, the Court found New Mexico's relationship with the
subsidiaries to be too tenuous to justify the tax.15 4 Thus,
Woolworth and ASARCO clearly limit the authority of a state to
144. Id. at 439.
145. Id. The Court cautioned that the Mobil holding did not imply that all dividend
income received by interstate corporations was taxable in every state in which it did busi-
ness. Such a tax on dividends might violate due process if the business activities of the
dividend payor were unrelated to the activities of the recipient in the taxing state. Id. at
441-42.
146. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
147. Id. Exxon was "a highly integrated business which benefits from an umbrella of
centralized management and controlled interaction." Id. at 224.
148. Id. at 225.
149. 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982).
150. Id. at 3115.
151. Id.
152. 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982).




tax income arguably derived from beyond its borders. Indeed, as
the link between income source and the taxing state becomes at-
tenuated, the Court appears ready to use the due process clause to
strike down the tax.
3. Discrimination
While apportionment deals with the multiple taxation of tax-
payers engaged in interstate activities, discrimination deals with
the unfavorable treatment of interstate commerce vis-a-vis intra-
state commerce. To determine discrimination, one must evaluate
the burdens on interstate commerce by balancing state and federal
interests. 155 In contrast to the nexus and apportionment criteria,
the discrimination criterion is more likely to provide the basis for
invalidating a state taxing scheme.156 On numerous occasions the
Court has struck down state taxes that placed a greater burden on
out-of-state goods or activities than on competing state goods or
activities, or that provided a direct commercial advantage to local
business. 157 For example, in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Commission15 8 the Supreme Court held that a New York transfer
tax on the sale of securities that operated to give investors a
financial incentive to sell securities in New York was unconstitu-
tional.159 The Court will not sustain any form of discrimination
against interstate commerce, whether in the form of a burden im-
posed only on foreign commerce or in the form of a disguised com-
petitive advantage for in-state business.160 Thus, in Lewis v. BT
Investment Managers6 1 the Court struck down a Florida statute
that prohibited out-of-state, but not in-state, bank holding compa-
nies from owning or controlling a business that furnished invest-
155. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Cities Service Gas Co. v.
Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
156. See Bison, Economic Protective Powers of States Under the Commerce Clause,
38 GEo. L.J. 590, 593 (1950); Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Tax-
ation of Interstate Business, 75 HAav. L. REv. 953, 962 n.44 (1962).
157. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963); Hale v.
Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939).
158. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
159. New York argued that since the maximum tax distinguished between two types
of nonresidents, those who made in-state sales and those who made out-of-state sales, and
did not discriminate against nonresidents in favor of residents, the tax, therefore, was valid.
The Court rejected this argument: "A State may no more use discriminatory taxes to assure
that nonresidents direct their commerce to businesses within the State than to assure that
residents trade only in intrastate commerce." Id. at 334-35.
160. Id.
161. 444 U.S. 822 (1980).
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ment advisory services to the general public. The lower court ob-
served, "[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by
state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been er-
ected. ' 162 Only in a few instances have the courts sanctioned differ-
ent treatment of interstate and local business. 6 3
The cases concerning state regulations best illustrate this bal-
ancing approach. For example, states have regulated the weight of
trucks,' the length of trucks,6 5 the length of trains, 6 ' and the
equipment and safety gear on trucks6 7 and trains.16 8 Although
these state regulations have a strong presumption of validity, the
state's justification for safe travel is sometimes not as great as the
federal interest in the free flow of commerce. Similarly, states have
attempted to regulate activities concerning public health, for which
exists an even stronger presumption of validity.6 9 Notwithstanding
this bias, when the economic welfare of the out-of-state resident
might be jeopardized, the courts are likely to strike down the state
statute.
Precedents exist for balancing state and federal interests, al-
though the balancing in taxation cases is somewhat different from
the balancing in regulation cases. 17 0 In regulation cases the interest
of the state is to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its citi-
zens and the economic well-being of the state; in taxation cases the
interest of the state is to provide revenue to finance the workings
of the government.
The Court in Commonwealth Edison, however, did not at-
tempt to balance the state and federal interests. Plaintiffs in Com-
monwealth Edison claimed that the severance tax discriminated
against interstate commerce because ninety percent of the Mon-
162. BT Inv. Managers, Inc. v. Lewis, 461 F. Supp. 1187, 1196 (N.D. Fla. 1978) (quot-
ing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)) (emphasis in original).
163. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794 (1976). In these cases the state itself had entered the market in a proprietary
fashion. For a discussion of the market-entry exemption, see Blumstein, supra note 80, at
533-41; Comment, Commerce Clause Immunity for State Proprietary Activities, 4 HAMv.
J.L. & PUB. POL. 365 (1981).
164. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
165. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
166. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
167. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
168. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129
(1968).
169. See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915);
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U.S. 189 (1904).
170. Department of Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734
(1978); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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tana coal was sold to out-of-state consumers, which effectively
shifted the tax burden to non-Montana residents. 171 The Court,
however, cited a long line of authority, including Heisler, in re-
jecting plaintiffs' discrimination challenge and, in effect, held that
a state could export its tax burden to out-of-state consumers pro-
vided that the exporting state did not charge the nonresidents a
higher tax rate than it charged residents. 72
The degree to which either local or out-of-state parties shoul-
der the burden of the tax is determined according to the amount of
value of the resources extracted or produced, or if the tax is shifted
forward to consumers, according to the amount consumed. The
majority dismissed the taxpayers' assertion that Montana may not
"exploit" its "monopoly" position by exporting tax burdens to
other states.1' The Court held that this assertion "cannot rest on a
claim that there is need to protect the out-of-state consumers of
Montana coal from discriminatory tax treatment. ... [T]here is
no real discrimination in this case; the tax burden is borne accord-
ing to the amount of coal consumed and not according to any dis-
tinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers.' ' 74 The
Court continued,
Nor do we share appellants' apparent view that the Commerce Clause injects
principles of antitrust law into the relations between the States by reference
to such imprecise standards as whether one State is "exploiting" its "monop-
oly" position with respect to a natural resource when the flow of commerce
among them is not otherwise impeded. The threshhold questions whether a
State enjoys a "monopoly" position and whether the tax burden is shifted out
of state, rather than borne by in-state producers and consumers, would re-
quire complex factual inquiries about such issues as elasticity of demand for
the product and alternate sources of supply. Moreover, under this approach,
the constitutionality of a state tax could well turn on whether the in-state
producer is able, through sales contracts or otherwise, to shift the burden of
171. 453 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1981). See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 618-19. The Court noted that ". . . to accept appellants' theory and invali-
date the Montana tax solely because most of Montana's coal is shipped across the very state
borders that ordinarily are to be considered irrelevant would require a significant and...
unwarranted departure from the rationale of our prior discrimination cases." Id. at 619.
173. Id.
174. Id. The dissent disagreed with the majority's view that tax exporting is not rele-
vant for purposes of determining the constitutionality of a tax. Justice Blackmun, in dissent,
stated:
"Like a toll gate lying athwart a train route, a severance or processing tax conditions
access to natural resources." [citation omitted] Thus, to the extent that the taxing ju-
risdiction approaches a monopoly position in the mineral, and consumption is largely
outside the State, such taxes are "[e]conomically and politically analogous to transpor-
tation taxes exploiting geographical position." [citation omitted]
Id. at 650 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the tax forward to its out-of-state customers.
17 5
Even if a court attempted to balance state and federal inter-
ests, it could nevertheless uphold a tax on energy resources. Pro-
ducing states, after all, have a legitimate interest in protecting
their resources from depletion. This interest probably would out-
weigh the federal government's interest in the free flow of com-
merce, even if the federal interest were affected substantially. The
states, however, could not prohibit the flow of a resource from the
state. Such a prohibition would establish a barrier to trade and,
thus, be unconstitutional.
7 6
Although the states' interest in protecting their resources re-
mains relatively constant, the federal interest varies. In times of
surplus energy, low demand, and a sluggish economy, the state in-
terest is likely to supersede the federal interest, even when the two
are in apparent conflict. Of course, the balance could shift if the
federal government actively promoted its policy of developing al-
ternative energy resources and encouraging domestic production of
fuel.
4. Fair Relation Between the Tax and the Services Provided by
the State
The fair relation requirement presents the question whether
interstate commerce is paying more than its fair share of the tax
burden in view of the "benefits of a trained work force and the
advantages of a civilized society" 177 that the state offers to an in-
terstate business. The test is one of nexus and apportionment.17 8
Thus, the fair relation criterion has little independent existence.
Courts do not use a quantitative test to determine fair share. In
general, courts uphold a tax that only roughly approximates the
175. Id. at 619-20 n.8.
176. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982)
(New Hampshire statute empowering the state public utilities commission to prohibit the
exportation of hydroelectric energy 5ut of state held unconstitutional); City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of out-
of-state solid and liquid wastes to protect state sanitary landfills held unconstitutional);
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (Oklahoma statute held unconstitu-
tional because it prohibited the shipment of natural gas out of state).
177. Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979).
178. Until Commonwealth Edison, the Supreme Court had not addressed the ele-
ments of the fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test. The Court in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978), rejected a challenge
under the fair relation test because of a lack of evidence in the record to support the conten-
tion. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:24 (Supp. 1982).
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value of the services rendered by the state. The proceeds from the
tax need not defray expenses generated by the local activities of
the multistate business. Thus, in Commonwealth Edison the Su-
preme Court stated that "complex factual inquiries" into what
costs the state incurs to provide the benefits of a civilized society
are beyond a court's expertise.17 9 The relevant test is not "the
amount of the tax or the value of the benefits allegedly bestowed
as measured by the costs the State incurs on account of the tax-
payer's activities." 180 Rather, the test is whether "the measure of
the tax must be reasonably related to the extent of the [taxpayer's]
contact [with the State], since it is the activities or presence of the
taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear a 'just
share of state tax burden.' "181
Some commentators argue that courts should interpret the
test differently. 8 2 For example, in user charge cases courts have
examined fair relation in great detail and balanced the rate of the
tax with the activities of the business within the state. 83 The dis-
senting opinion in Commonwealth Edison supports this view and
notes that "complex factual inquiries" should be made as a
"threshhold inquiry" and are not "beyond judicial competence.1 84
B. Due Process Clause
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 8 5 also is
a limitation on the state taxing power. In general, the due process
clause prohibits the imposition of taxes upon an out-of-state tax-
payer with insufficient connections with the taxing state. "To pass
due process clause muster, the event taxed must bear a rational
relationship to the taxing state. 1 86 In addition, the due process
clause requires fair apportionment of the tax to the taxpayer's ac-
179. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619-20 n.8 (1981).
180. Id. at 625 (emphasis in original).
181. Id. at 626 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254
(1938)).
182. See e.g., Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of
Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 245, 249-50 (1978).
183. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S.
707, 712-13 (1972); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 545 (1950); California v.
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 112 (1941).
184. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 651 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
186. P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:3, at 19; see Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S.
267, 272-73 (1978); Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 324-25
(1968); American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451, 458 (1965).
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tivities within the state.18 7 These two requirements overlap the
nexus and apportionment criteria under the commerce clause. 188
Courts utilize rather lenient standards to determine whether these
requirements have been met.189 Minimal contacts, such as one em-
ployee in the state, are sufficient to establish nexus.190 The appor-
tionment requirement does not impose a limit on the amount of an
otherwise lawful tax; rather, the tax is valid if it is apportioned
fairly to the taxpayer's activities within the state.' 9 ' Thus, state
taxing schemes that raise the most controversy under the due pro-
cess clause are those that are questionable under the commerce
clause-taxes imposed on the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
The limitations of the due process and commerce clauses are
not coextensive. The commerce clause only limits state taxes af-
fecting interstate commerce. If Congress has given states exclusive
rights to tax, as in the case of insurance, 92 the commerce clause
does not impose a limitation on the tax; the due process clause,
however, remains a limitation on the tax.'9s Until recently, courts
had held few energy taxes to be violative of the due process
clause.1
9 4
In Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, however, the Court of-
fered dictum that a severance tax "may be judicially disapproved"
if it amounts to the "'confiscation of property.' ,,195 Thus, if the
severance tax were 100% rather than 30%, a valid due process
187. See Norfolk & W.R. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968); P.
HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:3, at 19-20.
188. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756
(1967); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949).
189. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974); A.
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v.
Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921).
190. See supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text. But see Miller Bros. v. Maryland,
347 U.S. 340 (1954) (Maryland could not compel a Delaware vendor to collect taxes on sales
made to Maryland residents because the due process clause requires more contacts with the
state than simply advertising, delivery of goods, and occasional mailing of circulars by a
business.).
191. P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, § 2:6.
192. McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1976).
193. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 698
(1981); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964); State Bd. of
Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
194. In ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1982), and F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Rev. Dep't, 102 S. Ct. 86 (1982), the Court invalidated state
income taxes on due process grounds. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
195. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. at 627 n.17 (quoting A.
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934)).
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claim might exist. One could also apply a similar rationale to prop-
erty, income, and excise taxes that are so exorbitant that they con-
stitute an unfair taking of property.198
C. The Equal Protection Clause
A court will sustain a tax under the equal protection clause'
97
if the court finds that the tax has a legitimate purpose and if the
lawmakers reasonably could have believed that the use of the chal-
lenged classification would promote that purpose.' 8 States gener-
ally have great discretion in making classifications in tax statutes.
"It is inherent in the exercise of the power to tax that a state be
free to select the subjects of taxation and to grant exemptions."1 99
Courts take a liberal view of both the rationality of the classifica-
tion and the legitimacy of the state purpose. 200 The test of ration-
ality is not whether the tax in fact accomplished its purpose, but
whether "any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it. ' ' 2b1 A tax must be "palpably arbitrary" or invidious to
violate the equal protection clause. 02 The test of legitimacy is
whether the state purpose is within its authority to regulate, not
whether the purpose is wise. 03 If a tax meets the rationality and
legitimacy tests, then the state tax can discriminate against out-of-
state residents in favor of in-state residents. 04 The Court in Allied
196. See supra notes 149-54 & 194 and accompanying text.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor [shall any state] deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
198. E.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648
(1981).
199. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 509 (1937).
200. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Court held a Florida statute grant-
ing a widow an annual $500 property tax exemption was reasonably designed to further the
state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the gender for whom
that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (Illinois constitutional provision subjecting corporations but not
individuals to ad valorem taxes on personalty held reasonable).
201. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959).
202. Id. at 527.
203. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, §§ 3:2-3:7.
204. Courts have upheld heavier burdens on nonresidents if more than mere nonresi-
dency is present to justify the classification and even though the justification may arise
because of the difference in residency. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Met-
ropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935). In each of these cases the Court
proceeded on the basis that a state's application of a heavier burden upon nonresident cor-
porations or individuals is not a denial of equal protection if the classification is rationally
related to a legitimate state purpose.
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Stores v. Bowers2"5 summarized the wide breadth of the state's
taxing power under the equal protection clause:
The States have a very wide discretion in the laying of their taxes. When
dealing with their proper domestic concerns, and not trenching upon the pre-
rogatives of the National Government or violating the guaranties of the Fed-
eral Constitution, the States have the attribute of sovereign powers in devis-
ing their fiscal systems to ensure revenue and foster their local interests....
The State may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and pro-
fessions and may vary the rate of excise upon various products. It is not re-
quired to resort to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uni-
formity with reference to composition, use or value. . . 'To hold otherwise
would be to subject the essential taxing power of the State to an intolerable
supervision, hostile to the basic principles of our Government and wholly be-
yond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was intended to assure.'
But there is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating
the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational basis
and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule
often has been stated to be that the classification 'must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation.'
208
Because the equal protection clause imposes only a minimal limita-
tion on the state taxing power, a court would uphold a tax on natu-
ral resources even if the incidence of the tax fell disproportionately
on out-of-state taxpayers.07 In each of the cases in the Heisler tril-
ogy plaintiffs raised a fruitless equal protection claim.
In Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.208 plaintiff alleged that im-
posing a severance tax on anthracite but not on bituminous coal
created an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. The Supreme
Court concluded that the state had a rational basis for according
the coals unequal tax treatment because they differed in their
physical properties, in their uses as fuel, and in their alternative
uses.2 09 Similarly, in Oliver Iron Mining v. Lord210 the Supreme
Court likewise rejected the equal protection claim. Plaintiff alleged
that the state's occupation tax failed to include within its scope
certain mine owners, lessees, and contractors engaged in mining
operations and that it discriminated between taxpayers. The Court
held that the state had "wide discretion" in selecting the subjects
of taxation. 211 Finally, in Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hal 21 2 the Su-
205. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
206. Id. at 526-27 (citations omitted).
207. See supra text at notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
208. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
209. Id. at 257.
210. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
211. Id. at 179.
212. 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
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preme Court disposed of an equal protection challenge to an an-
nual privilege tax imposed on mining. The Court stated that
"[n]othing indicates a purpose to extend different treatment to
those of the same class.
213
The equal protection argument in taxation cases has become
so tenuous that plaintiffs in Commonwealth Edison did not even
raise the issue. Because of the broad latitude states have in making
tax classifications, plaintiffs probably would have failed to sustain
an equal protection claim. Nevertheless, an equal protection claim
could arise if a state were to substitute natural resource taxes for
all other taxes in the state. At oral argument before the Supreme
Court in Commonwealth Edison, Chief Justice Burger noted that
"if all other taxes on all other residents of Montana were repealed
and Montanans paid no tax," an equal protection clause problem
might exist.2 14 In 1981 lawmakers in the Alaska Legislature intro-
duced a bill that would repeal all state income taxes except income
taxes on oil and gas companies. 21 Although the legislature never
adopted this bill, the legislation illustrates a situation in which an
equal protection claim might be successful. The courts have not
addressed the question whether a plaintiff successfully could
mount an equal protection challenge to an energy tax when reve-
213. Id. at 289.
214. Arguments Before the Court, 49 U.S.L.W. 18, 28 (U.S. July 2, 1981). The follow-
ing colloquy ensued between Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stevens, and Justice Stewart-
Chief Justice Burger asked:
Mr. Attorney General, let me put a hypothetical question to you. Suppose the Legis-
lature passed an act declared on its face to be a substitute, in terms of revenue, for all
other taxes levied in the state. . . so that the locals would pay no taxes at all,...
and all the cost of government would be put on one category of taxpayers. Do you
think the courts could inquire into that?
And Justice Stevens next inquired:
Let me just take a step further the question the Chief Justice asked you. Supposing
your opponent's assessment is generally correct, that this is an extremely profitable
tax in a way for the state, and after you win this case, assuming you do, you then
reassess your budgetary considerations and decide you don't need any other taxes at
all, you repeal all your other taxes and leave your present tax standing in effect.
Would that raise any constitutional question in your judgment?
The Chief Justice queried further:
Then add to my hypothetical what Mr. Justice Stevens suggested, that all other taxes
on all other residents of Montana were repealed and Montanans paid no tax and all
the tax was thrust upon five companies or six companies engaged in extracting coal
and oil. Any judicial inquiry then, on any clause?
Justice Stewart intimated:
[Y]ou might have an Equal Protection Clause problem.
215. See H.R.B. 7, 1981, Alaska.
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nue from the tax is disproportionately high as a percentage of total
tax revenue in the state. Although the equal protection clause
should limit a state's ability to select one class of taxpayer to bear
a disproportionate share of the tax burden, the courts are not well
equipped to draw such distinctions and to examine various degrees
of discrimination. Courts either validate or invalidate a tax. If
these taxing trends continue, however, courts may be forced to re-
solve the issue.
D. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
The privileges and immunities clause provides another method
to challenge state and local taxes, although its utility is somewhat
limited. Article IV of the Constitution provides, "The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Cit-
izens in the several States." ' The Supreme Court in Ward v. Ma-
ryland"7 stated that
this clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citi-
zen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of
engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation; to ac-
quire personal property; to take and hold real estate; to maintain actions in
the courts of the State; and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises
than are imposed by the State upon its own citizens.2 1
The privileges and immunities clause, however, protects only indi-
viduals, not corporations.2 19 Therefore, under this provision courts
may not invalidate taxing schemes that burden oil and gas or coal
companies. Moreover, severance taxes have not been subjected to
any privileges and immunities claims since usually only corpora-
tions are involved in resource extraction.2 20 Courts, however, have
invalidated a number of excise taxes under this clause, including
the imposition of greater license fees on nonresident fishermen
2 21
and owners of boats2 2 2 than on resident fishermen and resident
owners of boats. Similarly, the Court has struck down taxes on out-
of-state construction firms 22'3 and vendors22 that were greater than
216. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
217. 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 418 (1870).
218. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).
219. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). For a criticism of this limitation on
the reach of the privileges and immunities clause, see Eule, supra note 80, at 449-54.
220. Further, severance taxes usually do not distinguish between residents and
nonresidents.
221. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
222. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
223. Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
224. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
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the taxes on in-state construction firms and vendors.225
E. Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause226 also may limit the power of states, in
certain instances, to impose taxes. This clause applies not only to
situations in which a congressional act or a constitutional provision
conflicts with state law, but also to situations in which no federal
enactment or constitutional provision expressly preempts state ac-
tion, federal legislative or constitutional scheme "announces, or is
best understood as implying, a congressional purpose to 'occupy
the field.' -1227 A court will examine the policies, objectives, and
comprehensiveness of the federal regulatory scheme to determine
whether Congress intended to exercise exclusive control over a
matter.228
Three recent Supreme Court cases have addressed the effect
of certain congressional legislation on state taxes of energy. In Ari-
zona Public Service Co. v. Snead229 the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of a New Mexico tax on the generation of
electricity within the state for the purpose of sale.2 30 New Mexico
provided a credit against its gross receipts tax for any generation
tax paid to New Mexico or to any neighboring state.231 Thus, any
person who generated electricity in New Mexico for intrastate sale
in effect paid no generation tax. The Supreme Court held that this
225. Another limitation on the reach of the privileges and immunities clause is the
Court's holding in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978). In Baldwin the
Court stated: "Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the
vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and non-
resident, equally." Id. at 383 (recreational elk hunting held not to be within this category of
rights). This requirement, however, should not limit, by itself, the application of the clause
in the state taxing context if those rights are construed to include "all the privileges of trade
and commerce." Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518,
524 (1978).
226. U.S. CONsT. art. V, cl. 2 provides that the Constitution and laws of the United
States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . .any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
227. L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23, at 377 (1978); see Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspective on Federalism and The Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959); Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88
YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
228. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973);
Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
229. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
230. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-18-3 (1978) (repealed 1982).
231. Id. § 7-9-80 (1978).
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taxing scheme was contrary to the Tax Reform Act of 1976,3 by
which Congress intended to prohibit electricity generation or
transmission taxes that discriminated against out-of-state
consumers.
23 3
Similarly, in Maryland v. Louisiana234 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the constitutionality of Louisiana's first use tax on natural
gas passing through the state.35 The tax statute required that the
tax should "be deemed a cost associated with uses made by the
owner in preparation of marketing of the natural gas." ' In addi-
tion, the statute prohibited any attempt to allocate the cost of the
tax to any party except the ultimate consumer. 3 7 Thus, the tax, in
effect, burdened only out-of-state consumers.3 ' In addition to
finding that the tax unconstitutionally discriminated against inter-
state commerce, the Court held that the Natural Gas Act,23 9 which
was intended "to assure that consumers of natural gas received a
fair price and also to protect against the economic power of the
interstate pipelines,2 14 0 preempted the tax. Congress adopted the
Natural Gas Act to prevent the states from directly or indirectly
regulating the price of gas sold "to regulate the wholesale pricing
of natural gas in the flow of interstate commerce from wellhead to
delivery to consumers. "241 The Court held that "[t]he effect of [the
tax was] to interfere with [the federal government's] authority to
regulate the determination of the proper allocation of costs associ-
ated with the sale of natural gas to consumers. 24 2 Like the Tax
Reform Act in Arizona Public Service, the Natural Gas Act and its
regulations demonstrated a clear congressional intent to preempt
the state tax.2 3 In Maryland v. Louisiana Congress intended to
subject natural gas to uniform rates and regulations.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
233. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. at 149.
234. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
235. LA. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 47:1303(C) (West Supp. 1982).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The combination of a myriad of exemptions and tax credits for Louisiana users
and the purported allocation of the cost of the tax resulted in a tax only on gas moving out
of state. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 733.
239. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1976).
240. 451 U.S. at 747-48.
241. Id. at 748.
242. Id. at 749.
243. Even in cases in which a direct conflict exists between a federal statute and a
state statute, interpretations of the statute or regulations and examination of the legislative
history are necessary before a court will conclude that Congress intended to preempt a state
enactment. See L. TRIBn, supra note 129, § 6-24.
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Maryland v. Louisiana illustrates the distinction that courts
often draw between purely revenue raising measures and price con-
trol schemes. In the former the tax likely will overcome a preemp-
tion challenge because one reasonably could expect that taxes will
increase the costs on the taxed person, property, or activity. In the
latter a court likely will find the tax to be a substantive regulation
that could be outweighed by a federal interest.
In contrast to Arizona Public Service and Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, the Court in Commonwealth Edison found no clear federal
policy to preempt the Montana severance tax on low-sulfur coal.
Plaintiffs argued that the severance tax substantially frustrated
and impaired the national policy goal, reflected in ten federal stat-
utes, of fostering the use and production of low sulfur coal.2" The
Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that Congress intended to
preempt all state legislation that may have an adverse impact on
the use of coal and held that general national policy did not pre-
empt the severance tax.24 5 The Court noted that it had to consider
the "specific federal statutes with which the state law is claimed to
conflict. ' 246 After examination of the statutes the Court concluded
that rather than being in conflict with these federal statutes, the
severance tax was implicitly authorized by them.24
Thus, "clear" conflict must exist between a state tax and a
federal statute for the federal enactment to preempt the state tax.
Courts are more likely to strike down a regulatory tax than a reve-
nue raising tax. In particular, taxes that attempt to regulate the
price of oil, gas, or other natural resources and are the subject of a
federal law are most likely to be overturned.248
244. See Power Plant and Industrial Fuel and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (1978); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92
Stat. 3350 (1978); Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat.
1125 (1976); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871
(1975); Federal Normuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
577, 88 Stat. 1878 (1974); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat.
1233 (1974); Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974); Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-158,
87 Stat. 627 (1973); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676
(1970).
245. 453 U.S. 609, 633-36 (1981).
246. Id. at 634.
247. Id. at 636; see supra note 122.
248. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (rejecting conten-
tion that broad, general national policy can preempt state laws that have an indirect eco-
nomic effect upon that policy). In McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1939), the
Court struck down a state tax on imported fuel oil. At the time of the suit, § 30 of the
Revenue Act of 1932 provided "that no tax under § 601 shall be laid 'upon any article sold
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IV. THE CONSUMING STATES' DILEMMA
As part III of this Article demonstrates, energy-producing
states have wide latitude under the Constitution in fashioning
taxes on energy resources. Except in extreme cases, these taxing
schemes will survive constitutional challenge. Unless the Court
dramatically alters its current interpretation of the Constitution,4 9
the burden of these taxes will continue to fall on the consuming
states. The growing fiscal disparity250 between the consuming
states and the energy-rich states is likely to have substantial social
and political consequences as well. A shift in population to these
producing states is occurring and with it a shift in political
influence.251
To prevent this growing fiscal disparity with all its attendant
consequences, the consuming states must resort to measures other
than constitutional limitations. Already, some states have at-
tempted to retaliate against energy-producing states by imposing
their own taxing schemes.2 2 In addition, consuming states are ad-
vocating federal legislation that would limit the ability of produc-
ing states to impose severance taxes.2 53 This Article now examines
how energy-consuming states are retaliating against the energy-
producing states. Following the discussion of the retaliation issue,
the Article explores alternatives and solutions to a potential energy
conflict between the states. The Article focuses on three "solu-
tions." First, Congress could devise federal revenue sharing plans
to reduce the disparity, although these plans are complicated and
often not politically feasible. Second, a state compact or agreement
limiting these taxes is an ideal solution if the states can reach a
for use as fuel supplies, ship's stores ... on vessels ... actually engaged in foreign trade
.... ' Id. at 424. The Court held that the state tax must fall because
[t]he Congressional regulation, read in the light of its purpose, is tantamount to a dec-
laration that in order to accomplish constitutionally permissible ends, the imported
merchandise shall not become a part of the common mass of taxable property within
the state, pending its disposition as ships' stores and shall not become subject to the
state taxing power... The state tax in the circumstances must fail as an infringe-
ment of the Congressional regulation of the commerce.
309 U.S. at 429 (emphasis added).
249. The Supreme Court, for example, could require a quantitative approach to the
fair relation and apportionment questions. See Hellerstein, supra note 182.
250. See P. Cuciti, supra note 9, at 58. Disparities in fiscal capacity have grown by
45% since 1967 and by 111% since 1975.
251. Id. at 12-13. See P. Mieszkowski & E. Toder, supra note 5, at 30-39 (discussion of
location choice and distribution of economic rents).
252. See infra notes 255-56.
253. See infra note 268.
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consensus. Last, the consuming states could develop their own re-
sources and become energy independent.
A. Retaliation
Some energy-consuming states in the northeast have enacted
retaliatory taxing schemes in an attempt to reap some of the large
amounts of revenues generated from energy production.2 54 For ex-
ample, some states have levied excise taxes on oil and gas compa-
nies. In 1980 both New York2 55 and Connecticut25  enacted gross
receipts taxes on oil and gas companies based on the sale of oil and
gas within the state. The New York statute prevented 257 and the
Connecticut statute limited258 the passthrough of the tax costs to
consumers. Federal district courts in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully 59
and Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dubno,260 however, struck down both taxes
on preemption grounds. Both courts concluded that the antipass-
through provisions conflicted with federal legislation that regulated
the pricing of petroleum products. According to the courts, one of
the purposes of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act was to
assure fair and equitable oil and gas prices among all regions of the
United States and to permit local taxes on these resources to be
passed through to consumers.26' The Dubno court noted that the
taxing statute stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex-
ecution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress" as to fed-
254. "Retaliatory taxes" is the label this Article gives to state taxes that have an inci-
dence largely on out-of-state taxpayers. The courts have used retaliation in a different way.
See e.g., Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648 (1981).
255. N.Y. TAx LAw § 182 (Consol. 1980).
256. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-599 (West Supp. 1981).
257. N.Y. TAx LAw § 182(11)(a) provides as follows: "[T]he tax imposed by this sec-
tion and any penalty which may be assessed under this subdivision shall be a liability of the
oil company, shall be paid by such company and shall not be included, directly or indirectly,
in the sales price of its products sold in this state."
258. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-599(b) provides as follows:
No petroleum company subject to the tax imposed under section 12-587 of this act
shall raise its posted wholesale rack price in Connecticut for any petroleum product
exempt from the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (P.L. 93-159) by an
amount higher than the average amount by which such company raises its wholesale
rack price for such product in all ports on the eastern coast of the United States.
259. 499 F. Supp. 888 (N.D.N.Y. 1980), appeal dismissed in part, 639 F.2d 912 (2d
Cir.), afl'd, 653 F.2d 497 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
260. 492 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Conn. 1980), appeal dismissed in part and aff'd in part,
639 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
261. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully, 499 F. Supp. 888, 899 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Dubno, 492 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (D. Conn. 1980).
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eral price control.262 Through the taxes the states were attempting
to insulate their citizens from the impact of the local taxes, and, in
effect, to regulate prices. Consuming states with downstream oper-
ations of oil companies largely have been unsuccessful in their ef-
forts to reap significant portions of energy revenues.26 3 Energy-con-
suming states now are considering joint efforts to coordinate
regional taxation of energy revenues. 64
Another method to retaliate against energy-producing states is
a tax on railroads, pipelines, trucks, and port facilities that are in-
volved in the transportation of the oil, gas, or coal from its source
to consumers. The utility of this type of retaliatory tax is limited.
First, only those states abutting the producing states or having
port facilities are able to retaliate. Second, the commerce clause
limits taxation of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 6 5
While railroads, trucks, pipelines, and port facilities must shoulder
their fair share of the tax burden, the commerce clause prohibits
unduly burdensome taxes.266 Thus, a state cannot impose retalia-
tory taxes on these instrumentalities.
A third method for the consuming states to retaliate is to levy
severance taxes or other taxes, the incidence of which falls on en-
ergy-rich states. Like the two types of retaliation discussed above,
this tactic also has its limits. First, to be effective, the states im-
posing the tax must have a monopoly on the taxed goods or ser-
vices. Second, even if such a monopoly position exists, energy-rich
states may not be the only states affected by such a tax. For exam-
ple, a tax on gambling or tourism would affect consumers from all
states.
In summary, the opportunity for consuming states to retaliate
specifically against energy-rich states is limited both constitution-
ally and practically. Both the supremacy and commerce clauses
present significant barriers to retaliatory taxes that would burden
interstate commerce or interfere with federal price controls of oil
or gas. Moreover, not all states have the resources to retaliate ef-
fectively. Thus, the taxing schemes could fail and cause businesses
to leave the state.
262. 499 F. Supp. at 906; 492 F. Supp. at 1014 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
263. BusiNEss WEEK, Oct. 26, 1981, at 170, col. 3.
264. Id.
265. See California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290
(1937); P. HARTmAN, supra note 12, § 2:6.




A court has only two options when presented with a challenge
to a taxing scheme. It either can strike down the tax and leave the
state powerless to utilize that tax to raise needed revenue, or it can
let the tax stand. A court cannot follow a middle ground and fash-
ion a new tax or limit the reach of an existing tax. Congress, on the
other hand, has numerous options available to it to solve the
problems caused by state taxation of natural resources. Congress
can limit the state tax, prohibit the tax from being passed on to
consumers, provide federal tax deductions to offset the tax, or pass
legislation giving the states an incentive to reduce their taxes.
267
The rates of severance taxes on coal thus far have caused the
greatest controversy. Several bills have been introduced in Con-
gress to limit the rate of these taxes on coal both on federal and
nonfederal land.26 8 Congress unquestionably has the constitutional
power to limit severance taxes on both federal and state lands.
Consequently, if Congress determined that a severance tax would
frustrate a national energy policy-for example, providing low sul-
fur coal for the energy needs of the nation-it constitutionally
could adopt legislation to limit the tax. Congress has acted before
in the energy area to further the free flow of energy and to limit
state taxing schemes.
269
Before deciding to intervene, however, Congress must consider
the form that a statute should take. What limit should be placed
on these taxes, and should the taxes be limited only to the sever-
ance taxes on coal? To the first question, no one would disagree
that the states should be allowed to tax enough to cover the costs
of the energy exploitation. These costs-social, economic, environ-
mental, and psychological-are not easy to determine. Studies
could estimate with reasonable accuracy the decrease in the quality
267. Congress has not extended its protection and control to the field of [state] tax-
ation, although I take it no one denies that constitutionally it may do so. It may exact a
single uniform federal tax on the property or the business to the exclusion of taxation
by the states. It may subject the vehicles or other incidents to any type of state and
local taxation, or it may declare them tax-free altogether.
Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
268. See, e.g., S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 2695, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980);
H.R. 7163, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6654, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980); H.R. 6625,
96th Cong., 2d Seas. (1980); H.R. 5294, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
269. For example, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, §
311(a)(2)(A)(i), 92 Stat. 3350, 3388-89 (1978), granted the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-




and quantity of the water supply, the amount of air pollution, and
the increased demand for public transportation, road construction
and maintenance, public services, sewage treatment, school teach-
ers, and police and fire protection. A greater difficulty exists in
computing the cost of depletion of nonrenewable natural resources,
or the psychological damage and aesthetic consequences of energy
exploitation.
2 70
Along with the problem of determining the state's fair share of
the tax revenues, Congress must determine whether only severance
taxes or all energy resource taxes should be limited. If Congress
were to place a limit on severance taxes alone, the states easily
could increase other energy taxes, the incidence of which falls on
out-of-state consumers. States could utilize any one of these other
types of taxes to accomplish the same result as a severance tax.
Montana, for example, has a license tax on mineral production,2 71 a
corporation license ta272 a mining property ta27 a mining
equipment tax,274 and a coal retailer's license tax27 5 in addition to a
severance tax. Furthermore, singling out coal rather than oil and
gas for taxation may not be equitable.
Even if Congress could resolve all the problems concerning the
form and content of federal legislation limiting state resource
taxes, serious problems in passing such legislation still would exist.
Interference with a state's authority to tax is politically sensitive.
In addition, limiting energy taxes could be a precedent for limiting
other taxes.
C. Revenue Sharing
One possible solution to the growing fiscal disparities between
energy-consuming and energy-producing states would be to estab-
lish a federal revenue sharing scheme that would transfer to the
energy-consuming states some of the wealth taken by the energy-
producing states. Revenue sharing is not new to United States
270. See Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 Before the Senate Comm. on En-
ergy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Coal Severance Taxes: Hearings
on H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654, and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
271. The tax is 1.438% of annual gross value of product at the time of extraction, if
such total exceeds $5,000. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-37-103 (1981).
272. Id. § 15-31-121(1) (tax is 6.75% of taxable net income).
273. Id. (tax is 45% of assessed value, which is defined as 100% of annual gross
proceeds).
274. Id. § 15-6-138 (tax is 11% of market value).
275. Id. (tax is $.05 per ton sold).
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fiscal policy. The federal government has long had various mea-
sures for transferring fiscal resources from rich to poor states. Tra-
ditionally, federal assistance to state and local governments has
taken four forms: (1) categorical grants-in-aid directly related to
narrow purposes as defined by Congress and administered with
tight grantor control; (2) block grants structured to consolidate
narrow categorical grants but with broader grantee discretion and
less grantor control; (3) intergovernmental loans; and (4) general
revenue sharing of federal funds with few restrictions.27 6 The State
and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972277 controls general revenue
sharing schemes. Under this act federal funds are distributed to
states based on a formula that includes population, tax effort, and
per capita income . s s This allocation scheme, however, favors en-
ergy producing states because a state tax effort includes severance
and other taxes on energy resources, the incidence of which falls on
taxpayers outside of the state. Furthermore, no energy revenues
specifically are recycled under this system. Only federal funds
taken from all taxpayers are redistributed.
Any transfer system utilizing the redistribution of energy re-
sources would have several problems. First, the problem exists of
defining what energy sources would be covered-coal, oil, gas, geo-
thermal, hydroelectric, or nuclear, to name a few. Second, the
problem arises of determining what revenues should be re-
cycled-severance tax revenues from federal lands, all severance
tax revenues, all energy tax revenues, and royalties and lease pay-
ments from federal lands. Third, the transfer system would raise
the question of why energy revenues alone should be singled out;
why not revenues from timber, crops, and other mineral resources?
276. See Amyx, New Federalism: How is it Working, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 229, 230
(1976); Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of State Legislatures in
Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 279, 279 n.3 (1979).
277. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-65 (1976).
278. Id. § 1225.
279. In Canada, where the beginning of regional energy disputes is apparent, the gov-
ernment uses an equalization formula to recycle federal money to poor provinces. This
formula takes into account all revenue resource capabilities of the province-taxes as well as
royalty revenues, lotteries, and other revenue sources. A national average revenue amount is
calculated based on the population of each province. The federal government then transfers
general federal revenues to those states that are below average. Resource revenues are
equalized only to one half of the national average. Total equalization among the provinces
does not occur under this system because no money is taken from the richer provinces. See
J. Whyte, A Constitutional Perspective on Federal Provincial Sharing of Revenues From
Natural Resources (unpublished paper); Kwon, Revenue Sharing as an Improvement in
Provincial-Municipal Relations in Canada: An Evaluation of Saskatchewan Revenue Shar-
ing, 27 CAN. TAX. J. 576 (1979).
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In addition, the question of administrative feasibility persists. Like
the present revenue sharing plan, a comprehensive transfer system
would require complicated definitions and calculations in making
any allocations. Last, the political feasibility of such a plan
presents a problem. With budget cuts and the "new federalism," a
new program that would require an increased federal bureaucracy,
which would be difficult politically to establish.28 0 As an alternative
to a sharing plan based on energy revenues, the present system
could be modified. A modified system could exclude from the
formula a portion or all of a state's energy taxes borne by those out
of state.281 Thus, in determining the amount of federal revenues to
be shared with energy-rich states, the formula would give no con-
sideration to revenues generated from energy taxes whose inci-
dence fell on out-of-state consumers.
D. Cooperation
Perhaps the best solution to the fiscal disparity and tax retali-
ation problem between consuming and producing states would be
the negotiation of a compact.282 Precedent exists for such an agree-
ment in the Multistate Tax Compact. 23 Thirty-two states and the
District of Columbia have signed this agreement limiting state and
local taxation of business firms engaged in interstate commerce.84
280. From an economic efficiency point of view, such a system would be an incentive
for the energy-producing states to lower their taxes.
281. This proposal, like the legislative proposals discussed above, could raise the fol-
lowing questions: (1) Should all or only a part of a state's energy taxes be excluded from the
federal revenue sharing formula? (2) If some energy taxes are excluded from revenue shar-
ing, then which ones-coal, oil, and gas taxes? (3) What is the incidence of these taxes? (4)
Should all taxes that burden persons out-of-state be excluded from the revenue sharing
formula?
282. Although article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution states that "[n]o state shall,
without the Consent of Congress,. . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
state," the Supreme Court throughout its history has refused to apply this provision liter-
ally. The Court held in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893), that this provision
was directed only "to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political
power in the States, which may encroach upon ...the just supremacy of the United
States." See Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When is a Compact
not a Compact, 64 MICH. L. REv. 63, 69-73 (1965).
283. See ALL STATES TAx GumE (P-H) 551-556 (1981).
284. The following are parties: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Co-
lumbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia. The
following states are associate member states: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
and Virginia. Associate member states have all the rights of Commission members, except
the right to vote or to hold a Commission office. Id. 11 564-565.
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The purposes of the Compact are many: (1) to promote uniformity
in the taxation of multistate business; (2) to avoid duplication in
taxation of that business; (3) to facilitate taxpayer convenience
and compliance in filing tax returns; and (4) to help multistate
businesses in the determination of their state and local tax liabili-
ties.2" The Compact addresses income, capital stock, gross re-
ceipts, sales, and use taxes, although it provides for study and rec-
ommendations of other types of state and local taxes.286 Under the
Compact taxpayers may elect to allocate and apportion income for
income tax purposes under the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA).8 7 The Compact establishes jurisdic-
tion standards for sale and use taxes that require tax collections
and payments by vendors who maintain certain connections with
the state. 88 The Compact has two significant drawbacks. First,
states can withdraw from the Compact at any time.89 Second, the
Compact does not itself prescribe uniform standards. It does, how-
ever, set up the procedure and machinery for interstate coopera-
tion in the formulation of such standards. This cooperation, by it-
self, is a great step forward in any cooperative effort among states.
The states formed the Compact as a direct result of the Su-
preme Court's failure to restrict constitutionally the states' power
to tax. In 1959 the Supreme Court held in Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota2 9 0 that state and local jurisdic-
tion to tax could rest on sales activity of the taxpayer within the
jurisdiction even if the taxpayer had no physical property or full-
time employees there. 91 Later that same year, the Court refused to
285. See id. 1 552.
286. The Commission is the body that conducts research and makes recommenda-
tions. "Specifically, the Commission is empowered to (a) study state and local tax systems
and particular types of state and local taxes; (b) develop and recommend proposals to in-
crease uniformity or compatibility of state and local tax laws; and (c) compile and publish
information that would assist party states in implementing the Compact." Id. at 555. In
general, the Commission has no authority over party states, but it does have binding author-
ity in the arbitration of an apportionment dispute. The Commission is composed of one
member from each party state. Id. 1 554.
287. Id. 1 556. For a description of UDITPA, see P. HARTmAN, supra note 12, § 9:22.
288. These connections consist of directly or indirectly-by a representative or
agent-() maintaining an office or place of business; (2) maintaining inventory; (3) solicit-
ing orders; (4) making regular deliveries other than by mail or carrier; and (5) engaging in
any activity in connection with leasing or servicing instate property. ALL STATES TAX GumE
(P-H) 1 558 (1981).
289. Florida, Illinois, Indiana, and Wyoming have withdrawn as party states, and New
York has withdrawn as an associate member state. Id. 11 564-565.
290. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
291. See also Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960) (same).
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review a state decision that upheld an income tax in which the
only activity of the business within the state was solicitation of or-
ders.129 As a result of these cases, interstate businesses became
concerned about the prospect of filing tax returns in numerous
states and pressured Congress to limit states' jurisdiction to tax.
What followed was the passage of Public Law 86-272.29s This act
precludes states from imposing an income tax on a business when
its only activity within the state is the solicitation of orders or the
using of an independent contractor to make sales within the
state. 94 Since this statute was passed, numerous bills have been
introduced in Congress to limit further the states' taxing powers. 95
Interestingly enough these same types of developments are oc-
curring with severance taxes. The Supreme Court has failed to im-
pose restrictions on the energy producing states' ability to impose
taxes that fall largely on consuming states. Consuming states have
pressed for passage of legislation that would limit producing states'
power to tax natural resources and legislators have introduced nu-
merous bills into Congress to effectuate this purpose.9 One signif-
icant difference, however, exists between multistate business taxa-
tion and energy resource taxation. While all states should provide
reasonable taxing rules for multistate businesses-since all states
have these businesses within their states-only consuming states
have an interest in limiting energy taxes. Consequently, in the ab-
sence of effective retaliatory measures by the consuming states, the
consuming states may be unable to enter into a satisfactory agree-
ment with the producing states because they cannot offer adequate
292. International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640, cert. denied, 359
U.S. 984 (1959).
293. S. 2521, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For a detailed discussion of Public Law 86-
272, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 12, §§ 9:8-9:14.
294. Another part of the statute directed Congress to make a study and report on
state taxation of multistate income. This study's recommendations are reflected in H.R.
11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). This bill required all states to use a federal income tax
base, compelled them to allow the use of a two-factor apportionment formula, and man-
dated a uniform sales and use tax law.
295. See, e.g., H.R. 1538, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967). Since 1971 Congress has considered a number
of legislative proposals but the bills have died without congressional action. See ALL STATEs
TAX GUIDE (P-H) 570 (1981)..
296. See, e.g., H.R. 1313, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. R.c. H213 (daily ed. Jan. 27,
1981); S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. Rac. S420 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1981); S. 2695,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. S5371 (daily ed. May 14, 1980). See generally Coal
Severance Taxes: Hearings on H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654, and H.R. 7163 Before the Subcomm.
on Energy. and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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consideration. If, however, retaliation continues and is effective, a
compact might become more feasible.
E. Energy Independence
The consuming states could narrow the gap with their energy-
producing neighbors by becoming producers of energy resources
other than coal, oil, and gas. 9 The extent to which a state may
become energy independent will depend not only upon the natural
resources in that state, but also on the effectiveness of incentive
programs instituted by the state to promote the development of
these resources. A state that has abundant renewable natural re-
sources, such as hydroelectric power, timber, or corn, may be bet-
ter able to achieve independence than a state lacking these re-
sources or possessing only a limited amount of nonrenewable
resources. Since all states are able to use solar energy, all states
have the potential of becoming energy independent.2 98 Also, with
the development of fusion, energy independence may become more
likely.9
Renewable energy resources, however, will not become viable
alternatives to oil, gas, and coal in the absence of incentive pro-
grams. Both federal and state incentives have existed for several
years to promote these resources. These incentives have taken the
form of direct subsidies through grants and loans and indirect tax
subsidies through credits and deductions. The incentive program,
however, will take time to work and will remain ineffective as long
as oil, gas, and coal are cheaper.
Like the alternatives discussed above, the alternative of energy
independence has its problems. But this solution is the best way to
solve not only the consuming states' dilemma but also the coun-
try's energy problems. When the states become energy indepen-
dent the country will become energy independent.
V. CONCLUSION
The fiscal imbalance between the energy-consuming and en-
ergy-producing states has not reached its apogee.300 Although the
297. These sources include solar, water, wind, geothermal, ocean thermal, wood, hy-
droelectric, and biomass energy.
298. See D. YERGIN & R. STOUBAUGH, ENERGY FUTURE 183-215 (1979).
299. 'Nm, Jan. 10, 1983, at 53. While fusion could prove to be an important develop-
ment, the article notes that experts do not expect an operable commercial fusion reactor
until the next century.
300. Producing states argue that the impact of coal severance taxes on a consumer's
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consuming states are experiencing a substantial financial drain, the
general state of the economy also has had its impact on energy-
producing states. The demand for energy has decreased and with
it, state revenues. Nevertheless, as the demand for oil, gas, and
coal increases and severance and other energy taxes continue to
rise, problems of retaliation are bound to proliferate. Moreover, as
the conflict between consuming and producing states becomes
more intense, the federal government must be prepared to close
the gaps between the energy-rich and energy-poor states. The judi-
ciary is the most unlikely branch to offer a solution to a regional
energy conflict. Constitutional doctrine as molded by the Supreme
Court gives energy-producing states wide latitude in formulating
natural resource tax schemes. Thus, the Court appears unwilling to
intervene in state taxation conflicts in the absence of congressional
action.301 Congressional action is possible, but the problem persists
of how far the federal government should go in limiting a very im-
portant area of concern to the states. Perhaps a limitation of sever-
ance taxes on resources in federal lands may be appropriate. A
state compact limiting energy taxes is unlikely, and even if such a
compact were negotiated, problems undoubtedly would exist in
getting all the states to agree on exact limits of energy resource
taxation. Revenue sharing is the most complicated possible solu-
tion to a domestic energy conflict. Such a plan, which would in-
volve federal aid to energy-poor states, does not appear to be in
tune with the Reagan administration's "new federalism." Lastly,
each state could strive for energy independence, which when ac-
complished, could solve not only the nation's regional energy
problems, but also our national energy problems.
utility bills is only a few cents per month.
301. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 638 (1981) (White, J.,
concurring) ("The constitutional authority and machinery to thwart efforts such as those of
Montana ... are available to Congress .... ).
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